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‘Gods would be needed…’: American Empire and the Rule of (International) 
Law 
 
Peter Fitzpatrick*
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Abstract: In the perennial debate over whether the dependence of international law 
on power is complete or whether international law maintains some independence for 
itself, the latter position is increasingly and at best marginal. Here that direction of the 
debate is reversed. The very dependence of international law on power is integral to a 
relation of mutual dependence between them. It is in this relation that power 
constituently depends on an international law which, in its turn, contains a primal 
efficacy. That efficacy is illustrated in its countering the claims of American empire. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
*  Anniversary Professor of Law, Birkbeck, University of London. Sundhya 
Pahuja and Sara Ramshaw sustained this enterprise in many ways, one being 
an abundance of research and references. Tesher Fitzpatrick helped with 
Rousseau, yet again. 
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If a grand solipsism is both constituent of empire and cause of its decline, then that 
irony should contain contradictions that are as intractable as they are significant. To 
unfold an example: the latest National Security Strategy of the United States, 
presented in the name of a putative President Bush, initially elevates an imperium 
comprising ‘a single sustainable model for national success’, a rather loose model 
made up of ‘political and economic liberty’ and ‘free and open societies’, as well as, 
more particularly, the market, human rights, and the rule of law, these more particular 
components themselves being associated with this freedom and openness.1 However  
by the document’s end it is clear that there can be freedom only so long as it is not 
ultimately free, and that there can be openness only so long as it is not ultimately 
open, since to maintain this openness and ‘to defend freedom’, ‘[o]ur forces will be 
strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in 
hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States.’2 This is but the 
making explicit of numerous intimations in The National Security Strategy that all can 
be free and open so long as the United States remains predominant, so long as it does 
 
1 G. W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 
Preface (2002). 
 
2 Id., at 30. 
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not have ultimately to open to others, and so long as its oxymoronic ‘distinctly 
American internationalism’ is not freely and openly challenged.3 To take just one 
instance of some current import, those who would join cause with the United States 
could readily know exactly where they stand: wider ‘coalitions’ will be resorted to as 
a means whereby ‘America will implement its strategy’ – or in Rumsfeld’s now well-
known version: ‘The mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must not 
determine the mission.’4  
All of which has been greeted or condemned as a change in direction but it is not 
so.5 Even though some such position is now ‘being put forth with an unusual degree 
 
3 Id., at 1. 
 
4 Id., at 25; D. H. Rumsfeld,  ‘Transforming the Military’, 81 Foreign Affairs, 20, at 
31 (2002). 
 
5 For example, the ready and ridiculous contrast is drawn with the ‘cosmopolitan’ 
Clinton administration, the same administration that would deny any challenge to its 
trumpeted ‘full-spectrum dominance’: see J. Garamone, ‘Joint Vision 2020 
Emphasizes that Full-spectrum Dominance’, American Forces Press Service, June 2. 
(2000). 
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of brazenness’, the ‘imperial republic’ was ever thus.6 There is a related element of 
continuity which will prove central to my argument here. The world’s first invented 
nation is often said to have been conceived and thence sustained in opposition to 
imperialism, a contrast being drawn between monadic empire and the United States as 
one of a diversity of differing nations. The contrary argument here will be that nation, 
or at least the nation of modern nationalism, has been and continues to be a 
compatible carrier of imperium, and most effectively so in the case of the United 
States. 
Such a national imperialism relies on another element of continuity, on the idea of a 
surpassing sovereignty. That idea imports an existent or ever-incipient completeness 
of power, an illimitable authority, which can yet be determinately emplaced. This 
challenging combination was once effected, after a fashion, through a transcendental 
reference which joined determinate rule to deific scope. With the advent of modern 
nationalism, this combination becomes embedded in nation itself. And it is nation, 
 
6 N. Chomsky, ‘Chomsky in London’ Red Pepper, March, 22-27 2003, at 24. On being 
ever thus see generally J. Wilson, The Imperial Republic: Constitutionalism from the 
Colonial Era to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century (2002) ; and for the 
conjunction of American Empire in its origin and present configuration see P. 
Fitzpatrick, ‘Immanence of Empire’ in Jodi Dean and Paul Passavant (Eds.) The 
Empire’s New Clothes? (2003). 
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along with national sovereignty, which comes to take on the two diverse dimensions 
making up that combination. These dimensions match those of modern law, and 
claims to a rule of law would have law itself occupy the position of the sovereign. 
Operatively, it has never done so. Translating the Latin saws, it has always been a 
matter of ‘the preservation of the republic is the supreme law’ overriding the clarion 
to ‘let justice be done though the heavens fall’. The once-revolutionary dimension of 
the rule of law, its being ever-responsive to change and unsettling of any fixed rule, 
becomes predominantly oriented towards its dimension of determinate settlement. 
Without this taming orientation, the animate combining of these dimensions in law 
would pose a constant challenge to sovereign rule. In occidental systems of rule, this 
challenge has been countered by rendering law as the instrument of the sovereign – an 
outcome obligingly theorized by a compliant jurisprudence. It could be said, however, 
that there are constituent complicities between sovereignty and law, even the rule of 
law, for in that coupling law takes content and coherence from the dictates of monadic 
sovereign power. 
An antique but extant tradition of thought would take the national law formed in 
conjunction with such a sovereign power as paradigm, and it would see international 
law as deficient and dependent in the comparison.7 That still common, even prevalent, 
perspective is here reversed. Perhaps, the argument goes, international law as 
 
7 See H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law 1st ed. (1961) chapter X. 
 
 6
unencumbered of a singular, surpassing sovereignty, or relieved of some equivalent 
connection to an emplaced society, may be more true to law in itself. If so, can 
modern law assume a cohering and a commonality in itself? And if it can, might it not 
be that sovereignty is reliant on law for its sustained cohering rather than, or just as 
much as, vice versa? And if that proves to be the case, might it not be that the reliance 
of the national sovereign on law is a reliance not just on the law of its bounded nation 
but also a reliance on international law? If so, how may that law be constituted – and 
constituted apart from its commonly assumed reliance on nation or on the nation-
state? 
Many and large questions, but they are posed here to indicate a sequence of the 
argument, even if it does not unfold in exactly that way. The test of the argument then 
comes in the large ‘case’ of what is now frequently called American empire, an 
empire seen here in its current or recent manifestations, but also with some regard to 
historical depth. The test is a negative one in that it aims to evoke a distinct 
international law through its being that which opposes the imperial claims of the 
United States to a quasi-sovereign completeness. This is not at first a propitious 
exercise for it finds this to be a type of national imperialism compatible in ways with 
the domains of the international and its law. Yet, to borrow from a recent account of 
‘the new world order’ widely hailed for its eternal verities, it is ‘the weak’ who place 
ultimate reliance on law, including international law, and the ‘power’ of the United 
States can and will ultimately act untrammelled by law, especially when 
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‘multilateralism is impossible and unilateral action unavoidable’.8 That contrast not 
only heightens, or lends definition to, international legality but it also reveals 
imperative and counter-imperial ethics to this legality, an ethics which does not 
simply enhance existence but is a condition of it. 
 
2. LAW AND/AS SOVEREIGN 
 
The whole argument is now initially set in a worryingly simple and sharp division 
within law, each side of the divide being amply shored up in jurisprudential 
orthodoxy. Where some reassuring complexity enters is in the relation between the 
different sides of the divide and in what that may tell us about the quality of being in 
law. The rule of law provides a revealing instance. In its modernist mode, the rule of 
law was initially advanced as a secular certainty, and its quality of predictability, 
continuance and such remains uppermost in its occidental conception. For law to rule 
in these terms, it assumes an autonomy, a posited or ‘positive’ quality in itself. To 
achieve such autarky, law has to be coherent, closed and complete. If it were not 
coherent but contradictory, something else could resolve the contradiction. If it were 
not closed but open, then something else could enter and rule instead of or along with 
 
8 R. Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order 38-39, 
102 (2003). 
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law. If it were incomplete and not a whole corpus iuris, and thence necessarily related 
to something else, then that something else could itself rule or share in ruling with 
law. Finally, a law which in any of these situations is not going to be dependent upon 
something else must also be self-originating and self-regulating. 
Readily as these qualities are associated with the rule of law, in another 
jurisprudential tradition law cannot be autonomous and thence enduringly ordered and 
predictable since it must change and adapt to ‘society’ or ‘history’, to take only two of 
the overwhelming imperatives commonly advanced. And this contrary quality, this 
responsiveness, is also essential for the rule of law. If law were aligned with an 
invariant sameness, it would cease to rule the situation that would inexorably change 
around it. Furthermore, the very holding to a position requires a creatively 
accommodating responsiveness to all that would impinge upon and affect it. So, the 
rule of law cannot be complete if it must ever respond to the infinite variety of fact 
and circumstance coming to it. It cannot be closed when it must be ever responsive to 
all that is beyond what it may at any moment be. And in extending to what is 
continually other to itself, law cannot avoid pervasive contradiction. In short, its 
determinations cannot be conclusively predictable and ordered when, in its responsive 
dimension, it has to exceed all fixity of determination. 
It is the comprehensive quality of the rule of law which pushes its constituent 
dimensions to such stark extremes, but these dimensions can be found in any law, and 
indeed in any enduring existential condition – although there is a distinctiveness to 
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law yet to be rescued here from that generality. For the time being let me lay out some 
consequences for law of this dimensional divide, consequences which may at first be 
obvious but which ultimately become less so. These are, furthermore, consequences 
which go to establish the ruling quality of law, whether or not it is tied to the 
comprehensive claims of the rule of law itself. 
Given this insistent divide in law, it may be productive to persist a little longer with 
the obvious and to extend jurisprudential enquiry beyond its characteristic 
confinements to either side of the divide by considering in combination the 
dimensions which it would separate. ‘After all’, even though determinate positioning 
and a responding to what is beyond position are different things, there can be neither 
enduring position without responsiveness to what is always beyond it nor effective 
responsiveness without a position from which to respond. In their separation yet 
inexorable combining, these dimensions could be seen as marking the horizon of law, 
the horizon both as a condition and quality of its contained being, and the horizon 
opening on to all that lies beyond this being. Within that horizon, law’s ‘autonomous’ 
position cannot be at all irenically set. The assertion of position has always to be made 
in relation to the infinitely responsive. It cannot be enduringly stilled in its completion 
or in any positioned part of itself. This impossibility of invariant positioning, 
moreover, is what makes law possible. Even at its most settled, or especially at its 
most settled, law could not ‘be’ otherwise than in a responsiveness to what was 
beyond its determinate content ‘for the time being’. If that content could be perfectly 
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stilled, there could be no call for decision, for determination, for law. And it is in the 
very response to this call, in the making and sustaining of its distinct content, that law 
‘finds itself’ integrally tied to its exteriority.  
Yet, if law continually becomes itself and is sustained in its responsiveness to 
exteriority, there must nonetheless be a positioned place where this responsiveness 
can be made determinate. That which is purely beyond is merely inaccessible, and out 
of responsive range. So, law not only comes from but also returns to determinate 
position. And to sustain position there must be some shielding from an importunate 
responsiveness. Yet no matter how secure a protected position may be, it cannot be 
ultimately so. Even the epochal elevation of occidental law’s determinate dimension 
over the responsive cannot create an enveloped and settled domain. That elevation is 
to orient the movement of law acquisitively, even imperially, but it still cannot contain 
law’s responsiveness. Admittedly, with any law there has to be a constant, reductive 
effort to ensure that ‘the aleatory margin…remains homogeneous with calculation, 
within the order of the calculable’.9 The resulting content and the particular impelling 
quality of this reduction remains, however, pervaded  by the relation to what is 
beyond. It must still itself be labile and protean to an illimitable extent. 
 
9 J. Derrida, Psyche: Inventions of the Other, trans. C. Porter  in L. Waters and W. 
Godzich, (Eds.), Reading de Man Reading (1989), at 55. 
 
 11
                                                
Admittedly, vertiginous possibility is not the first characteristic usually attributed to 
law. Perhaps this unruly dimension could be rendered more conceptually tractable if 
the constituent dimensions of law were seen in terms of movement. If law subsists in-
between determinate position and what is ever beyond position, then what moves law 
is the antinomy between these two dimensions combined with their necessity for each 
other. This is a movement ever beyond what is determinately positioned ‘for the time 
being’, yet also a movement of return to position, and it is in the decisive combining 
of these movements that law assumes determinant force. More has to be said about 
law’s distinctive quality of determination, but before coming to this there is a 
momentous consequence of law’s responsive movement which needs to be given a 
central emphasis in my argument. 
This responsive movement replays or, in a more static sense, encapsulates the 
determinant antinomy ‘in’ law. If law is suffused by responsiveness, if it must ever 
respond to ‘society’ and such – as one jurisprudential tradition would require, then in 
terms of that same tradition law is intrinsically dependent and derivative, quite lacking 
in any content of its own. That same vacuity, that same imperative for law to derive 
its contents from elsewhere, resonates with the contrary jurisprudential tradition 
elevating law’s autonomy, since an insistent responsiveness requires that law remain 
‘pure form’ and surpass any of its contents, modifying or rejecting them.10 Before the 
 
10 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. D. Heller-Roazen 
51 (1998). 
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law, before this force of utter origination, its contents ‘for the time being’ become 
evanescent. Law itself becomes ‘absolute and detached from any origin’ anterior to 
itself.11 Here law ‘affirms itself as law and without reference to anything higher: to it 
alone, pure transcendence’.12  
Let me initially relate this desolate law to sovereignty, since, when we come to 
international law, we will have to accommodate the extravagant claims of the 
sovereign nation-state. ‘The first prerogative…of a sovereign prince is to give the 
law’ decreed Bodin, and that elevation of the sovereign remains at the core of the 
occidental polity: ‘In Western European societies from the Middle Ages sovereignty 
is principally conceived as a transcendent form of authority exercised over subjects 
within a definite territory. Its principal instruments are laws, decrees and regulations 
backed up by coercive sanctions… .’13 There could be no more stark illustration of 
 
 
11 J. Derrida,  Acts of Literature,  trans. A. Ronell 194 (1992). 
 
12 M. Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond, trans. L. Davis 25 (1992). 
 
13 J. Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from The Six Books of the 
Commonwealth, trans. J. H. Franklin 56 (1992); M. Dean, Governmentality: Power 
and Rule in Modern Society 105 (1999). 
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this instrumental subordination of law and its persisting into modernity than the 
unacknowledged echo of venerable authority in John Austin’s influential conception 
of law as ‘positive law’, law as ‘posited’ by a sovereign, as existing by virtue of the 
‘position’ of that sovereign – a position occupied by a ‘determinate’ and independent 
‘political superior’ who ‘set’ the law ‘to political inferiors’: in all, to adopt Austin’s 
famed formula, law is the command of a sovereign habitually obeyed.14 Subsequent 
efforts in this tradition to free law of its dependence on a sovereign endowment have 
only served to confirm it.15 In a more insightful and compendious vein, we find 
Agamben merging the desolation of law within an encompassing sovereignty, a 
sovereignty which ‘is the originary structure in which law refers to life and includes it 
in itself by suspending it’.16 That is the most pointed challenge to my earlier attempt 
 
14 J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 2nd edn and Lectures on 
Jurisprudence vol 1 1-2, 5, 170 (1861-3).  
 
15 Hart, without more ado, imports ‘municipal law’ as the paradigm: Hart, supra note 
7, at 3, 7, 209-210. Dworkin resorts to a purely transcendental competence rendered 
determinate by judges as the ‘princes’ of ‘law’s empire’: R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
407 (1986). 
 
16 Agamben, supra note 10, at 28. 
 
 14
to show that law could have no origin anterior to itself, and clearly that challenge 
must be returned to. It could be approached by way of another, more oblique 
challenge coming out of Agamben’s aperçu. 
What, in terms of that aperçu, could contain ‘in’ itself a law commensurate in its 
range and effect with the whole of life? Derrida provides a generative answer in his 
discussion of ‘the concept of sovereignty,…the sovereignty of the state’ – an answer 
central to the rest of my paper, so it should be given a full rendition: 
 
It was at the beginning a religious concept, that is, God, the Almighty is 
sovereign. Then in absolute monarchies, the king was sovereign, that is, 
Almighty by virtue of God, because God gave him this power. Then this 
concept of sovereignty became, as one says, secularised, that is, one 
could, with Rousseau for instance, say that people in a democracy, in a 
republic, the people become sovereign, and in principle without depending 
on God for this sovereignty. But if you read closely Rousseau you will see 
that there is something sacred – and that’s Rousseau’s word – in the 
people’s sovereignty, in the democratic or republican sovereignty of the 
people. So here you have a concept which is in principle secularised, but 
for which the very secularisation means the inheritance of a theological 
memory.  It is a theological phantasm or concept. When for instance Carl 
Schmitt says that all the political concepts, all the concepts of the political, 
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in the Western society are theological concepts secularised, that is what he 
means: that our culture lives on secularised sacred concepts, secularised 
theological concepts. Even the current stage, of, let’s say, democracy, not 
to speak of absolute monarchy, of inherited monarchy, but even the 
concept in which one defines the nation state, the modern nation state, the 
modern democracy – these concepts are still theological, they are still tied 
to the idea of sovereignty which is a theological heritage, a religious 
heritage.17
 
That account could be supplemented, in a conventional sense, by noting that 
Rousseau’s ascription of a ‘sacred’ quality to ‘the social order’ was attended with a 
notorious difficulty.18 The sovereignty of the people needed ‘universal and 
 
17 J. Derrida, A Discussion with Jacques Derrida, 5 Theory and Event, at 49 (2001)  
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.1derrida.html.  ‘Phantasm’  in 
its spectral variant has an abundant resonance for Derrida: see note 39 infra.. For the 
point attributed to Schmitt, some relevant references would be C. Schmitt, Political 
Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. G. Schwab 36 (1985), 
C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans G. Schwab 42 (1996). 
 
 
18 J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston  50 (1968). 
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compelling power to move and dispose of each part in whatever manner is beneficial 
to the whole’, so much so that ‘the social pact gives the body politic an absolute 
power over all its members’.19  
I will return shortly to that momentous outcome, but for now remark only its 
condign relation to law, a law which Rousseau equated with the acts of the sovereign, 
and a law which thence had to assume a like universal scope – more specifically 
assume a detached omniscience, assume a determinative ability ‘beyond human 
powers’, such that ‘[g]ods would be needed to give men laws’.20 Almost as 
notoriously, the ‘giver’ of law had to come from beyond the determinate polity, and 
had to be endowed with the ‘miracle’ of a ‘great soul’.21 Yet Rousseau has the 
lawgiver alternating between this deific domain beyond and the enduring legal order 
which the lawgiver bestows, the ‘model’ which the ‘prince has only to follow’.22 
 
 
19 Id., at 74. 
 
20 Id., at 84, 86. 
 
21 Id., at 87. 
 
22 Id., at 84. 
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‘Gods would be needed’ then not only to occupy the suprahuman and unalloyed 
beyond, the realm of the purely possible, but also to embed an assured determinate 
order. One or other of these antithetical characteristics has commonly adorned deities 
– the ineffable god of infinite possibility and the god of complete and constant order. 
And, as in scholastic theology for example, the perfected deity would somehow 
combine both these characteristics. Connecting now with my earlier analysis in which 
law assumed similar characteristics, the perfected deity can be seen as a specular 
concentration of the law emanating from it. 
Law and sovereignty would seem, then, to be well matched since sovereignty’s 
theological disposition can be extended to accommodate the like dimensions ‘in’ law. 
So, sovereignty would optimistically combine in itself being determinate with an 
illimitable efficacy. To the extent that it may at any time be explicitly limited, by 
constitutional constraints for example, this limit can be suspended or abrogated. 
Sovereignty no longer relies on a transcendental reference to combine these contrary 
dimensions. Rather, as a secularised theological concept, sovereignty would in itself 
subsist finitely yet encompass what is ever beyond it. In so doing it is aptly endowed 
to provide content to a law which shares with sovereignty these dimensions of 
existence but finds itself dependent on sovereignty for its contents. 
How can this competence, somehow transcendent in itself, ‘take place’ within a 
profane world? Kant, for one, would prohibit such enquiry because it would not 
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produce anything, yet somehow also prove ‘a menace to the state’.23 Such enquiry, 
however, is hardly uncommon and its results are incessantly advanced, often vaunting 
the sovereign state or seeking to establish its necessity, and at times accommodating 
its orientation beyond any fixity of position in idylls of progress or restless expansion. 
The problem with all such enterprises, however, is that they are the contained and 
contestable outcomes of ‘the production of truth through power’, to borrow the term 
and something of the following thought from Foucault – and as such they are reliant 
on a facticity which may sustain but does not ultimately touch the matter of 
sovereignty, for sovereignty is a claim of right, not a claim to truth.24 No amount of 
asserting the happening, even the inevitability, of a sovereign act or condition – an act 
of war or a condition of effective control of territory, to offer what will prove to be 
tendentious examples, can make the qualitative leap to being-in-right. 
 
23 I. Kant, Kant's Political Writings: The Metaphysics and Morals Ed. H Reiss 147 
(1970). Here he seemingly puts aside his own ‘enlightened’ injunction that truth be 
pursued no matter how ‘great the disadvantage’: I. Kant, Grounding for the 
Metaphysics of Morals 64 (1993). 
 
24 M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972 - 
1977, trans. C. Gordon et al. 93 (1980), and see generally 92-108. 
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How, then, can that be done? Kant offers an answer, the shock of which in the 
setting of ‘enlightened’ thought may relieve what could by now be its monotony in 
the setting of this paper:  
 
A law which is so sacred (i.e. inviolable) that it is practically a crime even 
to cast doubt upon it and thus to suspend its effectiveness for even an 
instant, cannot be thought of as coming from human beings, but from 
some infallible supreme legislator. That is what is meant by the saying 
that ‘all authority comes from God,’ which is not a historical derivation of 
the civil constitution, but an idea expressed as a practical principle of 
reason… .25
 
Gods, or a god, would still be needed. Yet this has also to be not just a practical 
principle but also one that will conform to reason. 
Taking that as a daunting agenda, we could seek initial assurance in the intensely 
practical by posing the issue of how sovereignty could be sovereign without the law. 
The sovereign has to traject temporally not just what it would continuously require of 
its subjects but its very own being, and in so doing it must sustain both requirement 
and being beyond, or even contrary to, the impelling force of existent factuality. Both 
 
25 Kant, supra note 23 (Political Writings), at 143 – his emphasis. 
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requirement and being share what Beardsworth discerns as ‘the essential lack of 
identity to all human organizations’.26 In an immediate way this could be seen as the 
inevitable lack in the identity of the organization as it faces the vagaries of future 
time, but that same lack must also be seen as intrinsic to the identity itself. What the 
organization is ‘for the time being’ will always lack in relation to what in time 
constantly impinges on and challenges it, but the survival of the organization beyond 
its fleeting foundation, its continuance in time, will depend on its constituently 
integrating that lack. To do this, the organization has only one continuously extensive 
and amenable means, and that is law. So, whilst law in one of its configurations 
depends on a sovereign, the sovereign also depends on law. 
The argument could be concentrated now in a return to Agamben’s conception of 
sovereignty as ‘the originary structure in which law refers to life and includes it in 
itself by suspending it’.27 To repeat somewhat, in its dependence or desolation, law is 
reliant on a sovereignty anterior to it for the endowment of its content. This is a law 
which, as Agamben would have it (by way of a borrowing from Savigny), ‘has no 
existence in itself, but rather has its being in the very life of men’.28 Yet how can 
 
26 R. Beardsworth,  Derrida & the Political 146 (1996). 
 
27 Agamben, supra note 10, at 28. 
 
28 Id., at 27. 
 21
                                                                                                                                           
there be something ‘originary’ anterior to a law commensurate in range and effect 
with life itself? From where would such originary matter come from beyond life 
itself? The puzzle is heightened in Agamben’s advancing sovereignty as both coming 
from beyond and yet itself not ‘a power external to law’.29 Furthermore, and as we 
saw, once with-in law sovereignty’s endowment to it can always be exceeded and 
countered by that law. To support an anterior, and exterior, sovereignty Agamben 
offers the exception, the exception to what the law is ‘for the time being’: ‘only the 
sovereign decision on the state of exception opens the space in which it is possible to 
trace borders between inside and outside and in which determinate rules can be 
assigned to determinate territories.’30 There has indeed to be some such surpassing 
decision beyond what law may ‘at any time’ be if it is to have and sustain some 
determinate content. That much emerged from the earlier analysis in this paper of law 
and of the rule of law. But from that analysis it also emerged that this competence was 
integral to law. Agamben would seem to confirm as much: ‘Law is made of nothing 
but what it manages to capture inside itself through the inclusive exclusion of the 
 
 
29 Id., at 28. 
 
30 Id., at 21. 
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exceptio: it nourishes itself on this exception and is a dead letter without it.’31 The 
exception, then must be of the ‘inside’ as well as the out and Agamben would 
explicitly find that the sovereign exception is not ‘a power external to law’.32 There is 
yet more. As we saw in the previous paragraph, sovereignty is dependent on law for 
its constitution and for at least some of its content. All of which still leaves the 
possibility of a sovereignty which, although necessarily dependent on law, still is not 
entirely encompassed by it. Whether that sovereignty is necessary for law, however, is 
quite another question. The claim of the rule of law as a legal system occupying the 
sovereign position would suggest not, as would the perhaps more confident claim to 
self-subsistence of a customary legal system. The constituent challenge thence facing 
these systems would be how to reconcile law’s ultimate vacuity with the attraction of 
content to itself. A response to that considerable challenge will now be sought in a 
sociologic of law. 
 
3. A SOCIOLOGIC OF LAW 
 
 
31 Id., at 27. 
 
32 Id., at 28. 
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There has been, in addition to an overweening sovereignty, another instrumental 
subjection of law in modernity, one which will now be drawn on here. This subjection 
is effected through an idea of society as a ‘ruling idea’, one elevated and sustained in 
its completeness by a further phantasm, by ‘an illusion which lies at the heart of 
modern society: namely, that the institution of the social can account for itself’ – an 
illusion engendered in the claim of society, in the absence of any reference beyond it, 
to have become ‘transparent to itself’ or ‘intelligible in itself’.33 We have already been 
visited by cognate apparitions, most pointedly by Rousseau’s ‘social pact [that] gives 
the body politic an absolute power over all its members’, a pact derived from ‘the 
people’ and their ‘universal and compelling power to move and dispose of each part 
in whatever manner is beneficial to the whole’, the only possible alternative to that 
social totality being the complete individual utterly separate from all others found in 
the ‘pure state of nature’.34 What now happens in this section of the paper is that the 
 
33 C. Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, 
Totalitarianism trans. J. B. Thompson 184, 201, 207 (1986). And on the ruling idea 
see K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology Part I 64 (1974). 
 
34 Rousseau supra note 18, at 50; J.-J. Rousseau, A Discourse on the Origin of 
Inequality in The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G.D.H. Cole 136 (1986), see 
generally 60-65. 
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completeness of this ‘whole’ and of ‘parts’ such as the individual is tested and found 
wanting. Each is opened up and constituted in an integral relation to the other, an 
other supposedly subsumed or rejected in the completeness. To counter what may 
well be a premonitory weariness in the reader, it would be as well to acknowledge at 
the outset that sociology both offers divisions comparable to that between some such 
‘whole’ and ‘parts’ and finds them to be constituted in relation to each other.35 But 
just how, conceptually, they can relate constituently yet retain an integral identity 
remains a mystery. It is, to intimate something of an answer, a mystery similar to that 
facing Bodin’s prince who, in exercising his ‘first prerogative’, has ‘to give law to all 
in general and each in particular’.36 First, however, there should be some indication of 
what these claims to completeness may be. 
The claims to the completeness of the social whole may appear especially 
formidable but their very variety is some intimation of their failure. At the risk of 
being over-schematic, three related manifestations could be identified. With one, there 
is an enfolding closure which combines society with some encompassing force or 
entity. Variants involve some capital pervasion – of leadership, of communion – 
inhabiting society and conferring on it what is in common between its members. The 
 
35 Copious examples will be offered shortly. 
 
36 Bodin supra note 13, at 56. 
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most ‘perfect’ example of this is perhaps totalitarianism, but liberal claims to ‘the end 
of history’ could also qualify. This kind of encompassing closure is usually rendered 
in terms of what is natural or organic about society or its members, or in terms of 
some purposeful agency, some vital and universal force or formula – the will of the 
leader, the spirit of a race, of history, of the people. It follows from its supposed 
totality that with such a society each member is confined in a relation to the social or 
to its expression, a relation which displaces or incorporates the relations between 
members. It would also be the case that society as totality absorbs all alterity. There 
can be neither division within it nor can there be anyone apart from it. And it follows, 
furthermore, that such a society itself can never be anything other than what it is – a 
kind of terminal stasis. On this point the second manifestation of the social totality 
may seem quite different but it only somewhat moderates the first. Here society is still 
developing or evolving but it remains society as a totality which is developing or 
evolving. Its inclusive completeness is yet to come. The third is less a moderation and 
more a reprise of the first manifestation. Here some force is identified which, although 
within society, has a comprehensive constituent effect on it – economy, different 
diachronies, various sociological laws. Yet with these forces within, we still end up on 
the plane of the impossible social totality, but now with the puzzle of how something 
encompassed within society may also encompassingly determine or impel it. 
As for the social parts, these also can be presented in a worryingly tripartite 
division. With one, the parts are carriers of a determinant social whole and 
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constituently pervaded by its distinctive force. With another, distinctiveness is less 
evident, the whole and the parts being constituently interdependent. The divide 
between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ is often seen in this way. With the third, the now 
misnamed ‘part’ breaks away, as it where, and itself assumes distinctness and 
completeness, the social being a mere resultant of the relations between the distinct 
entities. ‘Methodological individualism’, where society is rendered entirely in terms 
of its individuals members and denied any distinct efficacy, offers perhaps the 
strongest example, but there are broadly similar reductions of the social in 
economistic versions of it or where it is allowed to appear only in the perspectives or 
interpretations brought to bear on it.37 Here the social endures only adjectively. This 
third rebellious ‘part’ is the significant one here. The first is simply subsumed in a 
distinct whole and the second simply sets the problematic which will now be 
considered. 
For a society of parts or particulates to ‘work’, for its particular entities to be 
distinct yet in common, it could only be a society of conjoint insularity in which the 
entities would be the same as each other, quite interchangeable, and thence lose any 
 
37 For these ‘parts’ and debates about their force and sufficiency, see for example P. 
Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, 2nd edition 
(1990); S. Lukes, Methodological Individualism Reconsidered, in D. Emmet and A. 
MacIntyre (Eds.), Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis (1970).  
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substantive distinctness. All of which would obviate the relation between the entities 
which generated the social ‘in the first place’. Another terminal impasse. 
Alternatively, if the substantive distinctness of the entities is to be preserved, then 
they could only advance as many different versions of what is social or in common as 
there are entities. This would be the utter dissipation of the social. Yet neither can 
these entities in their distinct particularity relate simply or solely to a set totality, to 
some comprehensively determined and determining commonality beyond. That would 
be to lose the particularity and the distinctness in a comprehensive determination and 
to return to the terminal stasis of a social totality. 
Something has to ‘give’. The seemingly paradoxical price of the distinctness of 
social entities in their relation is the existence of some determinate being-in-common 
inhabiting and limiting the entities ‘in’ their very distinctness. Putting it in Davidson’s 
terms, the entities could exist distinctly yet in relation ‘only if there is a common 
coordinate system on which to plot them; yet the existence of a common system belies 
the claim to dramatic incomparability’, to an utter distinctness.38 There must, 
however, be some ‘give’ on the other side as well. Society as the being-in-common of 
these entities cannot be an all-absorbing totality in the relation to them. It has, for 
itself, to be determinate, delimited and existently constituted, in that relation. 
 
38 D. Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in J. Rajchman and C. 
West (Eds.), Post-Analytic Philosophy 130 (1985). 
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More abruptly, given the responsiveness intrinsic to relation, neither the society nor 
the social entities can be simply determinate, enduringly delimited. They have ever to 
extend beyond, to exceed, what is ‘for the time being’ their determinate content and, 
so as to continually create society, they have to do this in their relation to each other – 
in the relation between social entities as well as the relation between them and the 
social.39 The relation subsists, then, neither in the purely determinate nor in the purely 
responsive. With the first there would be a completeness of being and with the second 
a dissipation, both quite negating relation. Society, in sum, ‘finds itself’ neither 
completely constrained by the determinate nor lost in the liquidity of the responsive, 
but finds itself rather in their protean combining. It finds itself in law. 
Making up the sociologic of law just outlined are two apposite dimensions 
corresponding to those dimensions of law itself extracted in my earlier analysis. What 
that idea of law would add to the sociologic is the element of continuance sustained 
by the juridical norm. Society can only ‘account for itself’, returning to Lefort’s 
 
39 The exceeding in relation, and indeed this sociologic, could be seen as a bond that 
is, in Derrida’s terms, ‘spectral’: for a revealing use of the term in relation to 
international law, see J. Derrida, Nietzsche and the Machine in Negotiations: 
Interventions and Interviews 1971-2001, trans. E. Rottenberg 241 (2002). See also J. 
Derrida, Specters of Marx, trans. P. Kamuf chapter 3 (1994) on international law, and 
generally at p.63.. 
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terms,40 can only be and continue to be ‘in itself’, because it combines 
indistinguishably ‘in’ itself a determinate, a delimited factuality with a normatively 
oriented responsiveness beyond any existent delimitation. That combining will be 
returned to shortly.  What the sociologic adds to the idea of law is a drawing in of 
content to law, a content to which law has no constituent commitment. If that 
sociologic were given full play, the very societies which trumpet their intrinsic 
adherence to the law would be very different to what they are. The content of the 
social within its adductive law would have to be seen as contingent and partial, even if 
necessarily so. It would have to be seen as entailing the sacrifice of what runs counter 
to that content, and entailing thence, it could be hoped or expected, the recognition of 
responsibility for who or what is being sacrificed.41 Even if that perception of law is 
not entirely Panglossian, given its lack of content a desolate law is susceptible to 
being seen in quite other ways, even to the extent of being instrumentally 
subordinated to what would endow it with content, to sovereignty and society for 
instance. Yet even though law is constantly dependent on an exterior content and has 
itself no constituent content to pit against this, we saw that with both sovereignty and 
 
40 Lefort, supra note 33, at 201. 
 
41 For a brilliant engagement with the point see J. van der Walt , Law as Sacrifice, 
2002 Journal of South African Law 710 (2002). 
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society it was not simply a matter of their affecting law from afar. They not only 
generated law’s content but were themselves indistinguishable from that content. (The 
sovereign decision, for example, is not separable from the sovereign.) They 
themselves were within law, suffused by and dependent on it. They do assume some 
necessary invariance, however, and this does counter the unsettlement ‘in’ law. Yet 
that invariance, ‘really’ its semblance, is itself dependent on their ability to move 
beyond what it may be ‘at any one time’ and adaptively come to ‘[a]ll things counter, 
original, spare, strange’.42 And that is an ability normatively trajected. 
If the constituent complicity between law and society underscores an inevitability 
of law, there are typically modernist claims that would marginalize law because of the 
perceived impact of other forces in society ensuring social order and coherence. There 
are said to be, for example, tentacular disciplinary regimes rendering law 
insignificant, even otiose; but, in that sanguine spot of academic self-reference known 
as ‘elsewhere’, I have shown how such regimes depend integrally upon law.43 There 
 
42 G. M. Hopkins, Pied Beauty in The Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins 4th ed 70 
(1970).  
 
43 See, generally M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. 
A. Sheridan (1979). For the dependence on law see P. Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of 
Modern Law 147-169 (1992). ‘Sanguine’ here is meant in more than one sense. 
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are, however, other forceful phenomena of the social which I want to isolate and tie to 
law here because they will prove relevant to the constitution of international law and 
of American empire. These are, extending now Derrida’s accounting for sovereignty, 
‘secularised theological concepts’ which Lefort can be taken as collecting 
compendiously in the category of bourgeois ideology, an ideology whose text, says 
Lefort, ‘is written in capital letters’, and he would instance ‘Humanity, Progress, 
Nature, Life,…Society, Nation’.44 Then Barthes would enter and strip bare the 
elevation of these capital creations, seeing the ‘ideology’ entailed as a reduction of 
‘the historical quality of things’ to the image of the natural, thence ‘making 
contingency appear eternal’.45 A generic name for the capital creations naturalized in 
this way can be borrowed from Auden’s ‘Lament for a Lawgiver’, a lawgiver 
departed whose erstwhile jurisdiction extended over ‘Eternal Objects’ which are now 
bereft and ‘[d]rift about in a daze’ without his cohering presence.46 These Eternal 
Objects are deific entities able to combine in themselves an objectness with being sub 
specie aeternitatis.   
 
44 Derrida, supra note 17, at 49; Lefort, supra note 33, at 205. 
 
45 R. Barthes, Mythologies trans A. Lavers 142 (1973). 
 
46 W. H. Auden, Lament for a Lawgiver in Selected Poems 99 (1979). 
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For my immediate purposes, and in the terms provided by Barthes, what we find 
reduced into the image of the natural is the historical quality and the contingency of 
law. The way in which this naturalism would render Eternal Objects in their relation 
to law can perhaps be approached through G. E. Moore’s ‘naturalistic fallacy’ – the 
deriving of what ‘ought’ to be from what ‘is’, or vice versa.47 Its jurisprudentially 
renowned origin comes from Hume’s observing that in accounts of ‘every system of 
morality’ of his acquaintance there is a move or a slide from ‘is’ to ‘ought’, whereas 
the two are ‘entirely different’.48 Without going so far as to say that this attribution of 
fallacy is itself fallacious, there does seem to be more to it. Eternal Objects would 
seem to encapsulate a position not unlike that of the deity in versions of scholastic 
natural law. That natural law emanated from a deity which remained of the law, 
providing its contents, yet this was also a deity set apart from the law. The deity, 
furthermore, combined enduring order with all that should be. It combined them in 
itself into a perfect whole, a whole in which things could never be ‘entirely different’. 
No matter how apt or accurate it was for Hume to distinguish ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in the 
 
47 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica 2nd ed. (1993) chapter II.  
 
  
48 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature III (i) 1 (1777). In the Penguin edition 521 
(1969).  
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uniform plane of a comprehensive, and ‘enlightened’ reality, this is not the habitus of 
the Eternal Object. It is in its normative projection that the Object continuously is. 
Being indistinguishably what ought to be and what is carries the Object as integral 
beyond a confined present, providing the force for it to come to, and the potential for 
it to contain, that beyond. If we relate these dimensions of the Eternal Object to those 
of law outlined in the previous section, the Eternal Object can be seen as a carrier of 
the juridical – the juridical as the assumptions law must make for its own existence. 
Even if perception of the juridical composition of Eternal Objects will be subject to 
a varying agnosia, that composition may enable us to talk about them in a way that is 
more general than the verisimilitude of a naturalism or the natural would allow. ‘[I]t is 
not necessary to accept everything as true, one must only accept it as necessary’ 
asserts one of Kafka’s protagonists in debating the demands of the Law.49 
Sovereignty, for example, may not be accepted as natural but it is widely accepted as 
necessary and, given the earlier analysis of it, sovereignty would fit the characteristics 
of the Eternal Object. A naturalness could be lent to it when placed in particular 
‘natural’ places such as Nation. The instance of national sovereignty will be taken up 
shortly when considering international law and its testing against American empire. 
For now, the argument will be illustrated and advanced by way of another instance 
 
49 F. Kafka,  The Trial, trans. W. and E. Muir, in The Collected Novels of Franz 
Kafka 167 (1988). 
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assuming significance in those settings. This is modernity’s ur-instance, that of 
Humanity. 
This is a humanity of primal self-sufficiency in which the universally human can 
enter a finite world and become completely yet particularly emplaced. Extending the 
sociologic, especially in its countering totality or completeness, it could be said that 
those outside of that elect place, those apart from the universally human, must then be 
absolutely apart from it, must be of a different and distinct type of existence. Yet 
being universal, the human must (also) include all. There is then a split, an 
indetermination, within this humanity. There are, of course, well-worn expedients 
which would sustain a unified humanity. Being unable to assert its proffered integrity 
positively – that is, without confronting the split or indetermination within it – its 
characteristics are typically derived in a negative reference to the excluded. What the 
excluded are, it is not. Or, in a strategy overlaid on this kind of divide, some positive 
content is derived from the claim to exemplarity. With the exemplar in this situation, 
the uncontained or universal human can be concentrated in and exemplified by the 
particular, by the included as a particular people who not only supremely manifest the 
universal but also have a prerogative hold on it. From such exaltation the excluded are 
bidden, in such modes as the civilizing mission, to join the universal concert of 
humanity. 
Any such surpassing position which would co-exist with the essential unity of 
humanity would have to be held as a combined assertion of fact and the right, of what 
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‘is’ and what ‘ought’ to be. The factual delimitation of particular people[s] and their 
qualities is something necessary but far from sufficient for the claim to humanity. 
That delimitation cannot extend of itself beyond the existent particular without the 
conjoint claim that this is what all ought to be. The human here becomes fact and 
norm indistinguishably. More expansively, it is quite beside the point in the 
constitution of the human or Humanity that there can be no cohering of fact and norm 
within a uniform reality where fact and norm are now utterly separate, for Humanity 
as an Eternal Object is, borrowing Derrida’s term, a ‘secularised sacred concept’, 
uniting as it does an impelling force of transcendent right with a profane location in 
the factual.50 Making the human factually and containedly present reveals it as partial, 
as including some people and excluding others. It can only ‘be’ encompassingly 
human if combined with the dimension of right – in the rightful assertion of what all 
should be, of what all should come to. Yet that same normative extraversion holds out 
the prospect and the ultimate inevitability of the delimited arena becoming other than 
what it is, of the excluded entering and themselves taking up a rightful place within. 
Humanity, then, must carry in itself this openness, this incipience of inclusion, this 
ability to extend ever beyond itself and in so doing transform the nature of its 
constituent bond. 
 
50 Derrida, supra note 17, at 49. 
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This further paean to incompletion imported by the juridical can, in a way, be 
readily countered. Even if the ‘man’ of this humanity could be declared into being by 
the law, by certain revolutionary constitutions for example, did this not result in the 
elevation of a humanity above the law, the elevation of a ‘man’ instrumentally 
subordinating the law, of a ‘man’ who now ‘legislates without any ground or authority 
other than himself’?51 And was not, and is not, this humanity and this man exclusively 
and enduringly exemplified in certain elect nations?52 And even in its expansive, 
liberatory promise, were not the human and the rights attached to it primarily modes 
of a ‘tacit but increasing inscription of individuals’ lives within the state order’?53 
That dismal line of questioning will be extended when engaging with human rights 
and American empire, but it should be enough for now to raise more than the 
suspicion that the juridical dimension of the Eternal Objects may more securely 
embed a given dominance than challenge it, may more typically bring what is beyond 
within that dominance than bring the dominance transformed to it. As for the law 
 
51 See C. Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of 
the Century 93 (2000), 
 
52 See id., at 102, 109-144. 
 
53 Agamben, supra note 10, at 121. See also Foucault, supra note 24, at 95-96. 
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itself, would not its dependence on exterior content and its absence of any 
countervailing content of its own orient it receptively towards ruling power? And 
even if the juridical is needful for such power to be made enduring, does this not 
thoroughly implicate the juridical in that power? The formative force of the norm 
extends and intensifies the hold of such power, since the norm renders what the power 
‘is’ in fact as what it ‘ought’ to be. 
Yet there is also a contrary orientation inseparable from this containing one. It is 
because the ever extensive norm cannot be ultimately contained that its infinite 
possibility has to be drawn in repeatedly. And it is exactly where this reduction of the 
norm is explicit and enforceable, in law, that there is also an explicit dependence of 
that power. For although, as we saw, law depended on an exteriority such as this 
power for its content, ruling power in turn depends on law’s effecting the sociologic, 
including a sustaining normativity. That much has already been considered, but there 
is a further dimension to law’s dependence on and independence of power. Its 
dependence, as we also saw, was a consequence of a constituent juridical assumption 
– of a primal lack of limitation, an intrinsic inability to be bound to any pre-existent, a 
generative incompleteness and labile openness. It is in and as this open quality of law 
and the juridical that an ethics may be found, an ethics enabling law to ‘speak truth to 
power’, as many would want it to.54 The nature of this ethics should, however, first be 
 
54 For a significant instance see M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: 
The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 514 (2001). 
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clarified – if that is not putting it too optimistically. This is not an ethics of replete 
standards and principles, a guide to specifically required or desired behaviour. It is 
more akin to a meta-ethics in that it does not produce or confirm a detailed content of 
the ethical. What it offers is a generative intimation of such content. If that would 
render it more attenuated than ethics as usually understood, its further deviation from 
the usual could be seen as a strengthening of its ethical being. For, although this ethics 
is inevitably normative, it is also, in the stretched sense used by Derrida, a matter of 
‘ethos, of manner of being, of  habitus’.55 It is an ethics of the existent. 
Lest that preamble raise expectation unduly, it should be emphasized that there is a 
fragility, even evanescence, to this ethics. What it offers is an evinced normative 
which in its realisation is always countered, whence it persists only in part. Working 
through an example, in the irreducible openness of law, in its not being tied to any 
pre-existent differentiation, there is an incipient ethic of equality – equality before the 
law, to evoke a phrase. Truly, that ethic of equality can exist fully only before or 
anterior to the law made determinate, for with the coming of the determinate 
differentiation and inequality will always supervene. Thence the ethic endures in a 
shrunken life of ‘more or less’. Likewise, there is a freedom before the law in law’s 
not being tied to any enduring denial of it, a fragile freedom countered and rendered 
 
 
55 Derrida, supra note 39 (Negotiations), at 13. 
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‘more or less’ in the law made determinate. An ethic of impartiality can be situated in 
the same way. Law’s lack of ties to the pre-existent inclines towards a lack of 
attachment in its ‘application’. This, however, becomes inexorably compromised in 
the determinate scene of application. 
It is not only within law as determinate that this ethics assumes operative existence. 
There is also a dimension of normative assertion in which the ethics assumes a less 
inhibited, less attenuated existence. This can be identified with the help of Hart in The 
Concept of Law and his constant concern there to bring out how the concept of law is 
affected by legal rules being carriers of obligation, and thence being things formed 
and used by people in active and reflective ways.56 He would depart from venerable 
attempts in jurisprudence to identify law in terms of some ‘external’ factuality by 
bringing to bear an integral ‘internal’ aspect of rules in which people use them ‘in one 
situation after another, as guides to the conduct of social life, as the basis for claims, 
demands, admissions, criticism, or punishment, viz., in all the familiar transactions of 
life according to rules’.57 In this way, Hart opens up law demotically in a normative 
dimension, but having done so he resorts to diverse expedients to close it down again, 
for example by asserting a stable and containing ‘core’ to all rules; but what is 
 
56 Hart, supra note 7. 
 
57 Id., at 88. 
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especially revealing about this effort at closure is its failure, a failure produced by the 
impertinent openness of law and of its ‘rules’, by their incessant and imperative 
becoming other than what they are.58 It is in that infinitely expansive terrain that, as 
we saw, the ethics of law originate, and it is from there that such an ethics animates 
the ‘claims, demands, admissions, criticism’ which go to evaluate behaviour in 
relation to rules and which contribute to the creation of the rules themselves, a 
contribution that can be channelled and formed through ‘secondary rules’, such as 
rules of adjudication, identifying what is made determinate as law.59  
Such claims, criticism, and so on, as well as the whole ‘internal’ aspect of rules, can 
only have effect in a community which would ‘make sense’ of them, a community of 
some mutual regard among its members, and the ethics or meta-ethics we have been 
considering would extend to this community. As with the ethics of equality, freedom, 
and impartiality, this community has to be seen in truncated terms. The initiating 
openness of law, its not being bound in itself to any pre-existent exclusion, trajects an 
incipient openness of relation, an invitation to an inclusive being-in-common, to a 
 
58 For this and other expedients, and their failure, see P. Fitzpatrick, supra note 43, 
chapter 6, and P. Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law 97-99 (2001). 
 
59 Hart, supra note 7, at 88. 
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regardful community that is a ‘community of law’.60 Yet this would be, aptly 
borrowing the term from Nancy, an inoperative community.61 This community, when 
made operative in a determinate law that inevitably excludes, even if it also includes, 
then assumes a rarefied existence of ‘more or less’. Yet, like the ethical field it 
inhabits, the inoperative community remains insistent and unassuaged.62 It would be a 
bar to any ultimate exclusion being consistent with law, with the legality of inflicting 
death for example. 
 
4. THE LAW BETWEEN NATIONS 
 
 
60 Cf. J.-L. Nancy, The Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor 28 (1991). 
 
61 Id., at chapter 1. 
 
62 It could be argued that this ethics is enveloped by the containing force of law and 
the juridical. Like the normative generally, such ethics could be taken as affirming 
that the determinate, in absorbing them, is already what the ethics would claim it 
ought to be. But any such asseveration, in its turn, would have to ‘deal with’ law as 
disruptively open, as holding out the possibility of things being otherwise. And the 
alternation would go on. 
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It would be superfluous, not to say presumptuous, to summarily transpose this paper 
as far as it has gone onto the refined debates in the theory of international law. In a 
sense, as the cognoscenti will have anticipated already, the story up to now is a 
prelude to the engagement with international law now offered in this present section 
of the paper. What could also have been anticipated is the particular and persistent 
debate in international law which focuses this section. On one side of the debate, 
power is dominant over international law. On the other, law assumes some significant 
independence of power.63 Here I will draw on the debate in its broad lines and, in the 
process, bring in issues frequently related to it. That exercise will connect increasingly 
as it goes on to the account of law in the paper thus far. Next, and perhaps less 
predictably, the story extends to the dissonant relation between international law and 
American empire. 
An aptly stark conspectus of the two sides of this focussing debate is offer by 
Koskenniemi: 
 
We have either chosen a formalism that insists on the law’s validity and 
binding nature irrespective of its distance from the world of political facts 
 
63 For a recent and cogent analysis and account see G. Simpson , The Situation On 
The International Legal Theory Front: The Power Of Rules and the Rule Of Power, 
11 European Journal of International Law 439 (2000). 
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or we have become realists and stressed the law’s dependence on political 
facts and ridiculed “binding force” as a formalist fiction.64
 
And in the debate itself, no matter which side is espoused, power or realpolitik, 
variously conceived always seems to provide something of a primary force. ‘Even 
theorists sympathetic to international law’, noted Aristodemou along with much apt 
authority, ‘have seen its reliance on the practice of States as rendering the task of 
distinguishing the legal from the political problematic’.65 In its relation to power and 
such, there always seems to be some deficiency in law, something more which it 
needs in order adequately to confront power. Hence there are, especially of late, 
frequent calls for a new or renewed consensus on fundamental value in the 
international community so as to subject power to the rule of law.66 Yet it is difficult 
 
64 M. Koskenniemi, International Law in a Post-Realist Era, 16 The Australian Year 
Book of International Law 1, at 4 (1995). 
 
65 M. Aristodemou, Choice and Evasion in Judicial Recognition of Governments: 
Lessons from Somalia, 5 European Journal of International Law 532, at 545 (1994). 
 
66 E.g. M. J. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism After 
Kosovo (2001). 
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to see how any such consensus, or community, or values could exist without power 
‘in the first place’. Or there is a bind in Koskenniemi’s noting that ‘in the absence of 
an overarching standpoint, legal technique will reveal itself as more evidently political 
than ever before’, when he has already recognized that any such standpoint would be 
‘political’.67 So, whether political power provides some overarching standpoint for 
law or whether it does not, a deficient law seems inexorably to come to power. There 
remains a tangential force of international law which some would discern in its ability 
to lay down processual paths through which power passes in taking effect, or at least 
some of its effects, but even that consolation is being diminished of late by the 
perceived ability of power now to transform the processes constituting international 
law itself.68 In the literature on international law there seems now to be more and 
more a recognition of the ultimacy of a power which remains alone and apart. A 
recent and lauded, if hardly factory-fresh, contribution comes with Kaplan’s thesis 
that the irenic ‘paradise’ that is Europe can only cleave so virtuously to international 
law because of the sheltering ‘power’ of the United States.69 Yet even with all this 
 
67 Koskenniemi supra note 54, at 516. 
 
68 R. Mullerson, Jus ad Bellum: Plus ca Change (Le Monde) Plus c’est La Meme 
Chose (Le Droit)? 7 Conflict & Security Law 149 (2002). 
 
69 Kaplan, supra note 8. 
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abjection, there is impeccable authority for saying that ‘most international 
lawyers…cannot help believing that law has some autonomous, constraining effect on 
state behaviour’.70
International law retains at least a sufficiently enduring presence to focus enquiry 
into the nature of the power on which it depends. This is usually put as the power of 
nations or of nation-states, but some contrary regard is had also to the claims of 
imperium. It is important for my argument to show that these are not quite so contrary, 
and to set them together so as to develop an idea of power which would encompass 
both, some regard to origins is necessary. Here several anachronisms will have to be 
tolerated, including the use of the term ‘international law’ itself. 
Although genealogies in the trade often cast it further back, for my purposes Vitoria 
provides the point of departure, although in a way it is a point already departed. 
Vitoria produces an international law set in a theologic but, so Schmitt would reveal, 
the lineaments of that international law endure beyond Vitoria and beyond the 
departure of the deific element.71 So, when Schmitt sees international law originating 
in the appropriation of the Americas, this is international law as a ‘theological 
 
 
70 Simpson, supra note 63 at   . 
 
71 See Schmitt, The Land Appropriation of the New World 109 Telos 29 (1996). 
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phantasm’, to again borrow from Derrida’s description of sovereignty.72 What would 
purport to animate the resulting ius publicum Europaeum, what would displace the 
theologic, would be the supposedly ‘self-contained, sovereign, territorial state’.73 Yet 
‘in a world fully and exhaustively divided’ into such self-contained entities, there is 
‘no space left for internationalism’, including international law.74 What was left was a 
‘new spatial order’, an ‘open space’.75 How, then could the ‘space’ be both a space 
fully occupied by these states being in common yet also a space ‘open’ to imperial 
appropriation – ‘an immeasurable space of free land – the New World, America, the 
land of freedom, i.e., land free for appropriation by Europeans’.76  
 
72 Derrida, supra note 17 at 49. 
 
73 Schmitt, supra note 71 at 55. In the bareness of my account here there is a 
foreshortening of this displacement of a theologic and the advent of sovereign, 
territorial states. 
 
74 Z. Bauman,  Modernity and the Holocaust 53 (1989). 
 
75 Schmitt, supra note 71 at 30, 77. 
 
76 Id., at 37 – his emphasis. 
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How that came about can perhaps be clarified if we do not see Vitoria as the mere 
precursor of this space, if we do not absolve him of it  and its consequences quite so 
readily as Schmitt tends to do. The initiating reason why Vitoria is seen as getting 
international law off to an aptly exalted start is his universalist and supposedly 
humanitarian espousal of the interests of indigenous peoples during the Spanish 
colonization of the Americas.77 Vitoria set his lectures in opposition to the more 
predatory and more resolutely genocidal of the Spanish colonists. Contrary to their 
claims, Vitoria found that the ‘Indians’ had rights of dominium and that, furthermore, 
they were basically human beings, even if ones with considerable shortcomings. 
These rights had, however, to adjust to the expansive natural rights of all people, 
including the Spanish, to travel, trade, ‘sojourn’ and, in the cause of Christianity, to 
proselytize.  Such natural rights could not be aggressively asserted unless they were 
resisted but, when resisted, they could be asserted to the full extent of conquest and 
 
77 E.g. J. B. Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and 
His Law of Nations (1934). And see generally Vitoria De Indis in id.. Here and in the 
rest of this section, from time to time I will be immodestly using modest amount of 
Part II of Fitzpatrick supra note 58 (Modernism). For a fuller account of the present 
line of argument in relation to Vitoria see id., at 152-156. 
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disposition, and Vitoria did constitute the Indians as inherently resistant.78 Even if that 
terminus could be justified, as Vitoria would so justify it, in terms of scholastic 
theology, there would remain a point to the revisionist view that Vitoria certainly did 
bequeath the enduring lineaments of international law, but that he did so by way of 
providing a refined framework for one of the more spectacularly rapacious imperial 
acquisitions.79  
So, as Anghie puts it, the Indian in Vitoria’s lectures had to be ‘schizophrenic’, 
included in the sameness of universal humanity, even if Vitoria would not put it in 
such terms, yet set apart from it as different.80 And with Anghie’s elegant analysis we 
find that Vitoria’s lauded origin of international law is not so much to do with its 
conventional concern, the relation between sovereign states, as with the colonial 
 
78 For specific coverage of these points see id. (1934: xiii-iv [section I, para. 24], 
xxxvii-viii, xxxix, xli-ii [section III, paras. 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12]) 
 
79 See e.g. R. A. Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The 
Discourses of Conquest  96-180 (1990). 
 
80 A. Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law in 
E. Darian-Smith and P. Fitzpatrick (Eds.), Laws of the Postcolonial (1999) at 96. 
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domination of people burdened with racial difference.81 Perhaps it could now be 
added that Vitoria’s scheme imports imperial domination as effecting the relation 
between these sovereign states. Their completeness and sovereignty leaves no ‘space’ 
for the international, as we saw. There is then no ‘space’ for a dynamic enabling the 
international in international law to take on identity positively. In Vitoria’s mould it 
does so negatively, in the imperial division between the barbari, who are not 
sovereign or Christian or civilized, and the European nations which specularly are. 
‘Space’ filled with the theologic was compatible with division since the theologic 
indicated what was inescapably the case. This imperative assumed existence as ius 
naturale and thence as ius gentuim, even if the acceptability of the gentes could be 
debatable. Returning to Schmitt’s perception, then, what is carried forward from 
Vitoria is not simply division and a theologic quite vacated, a pure phantasm. What 
‘takes the place’ of the theologic with international law, what reconciles exclusions 
with the universally inclusive, is the Eternal Object variously formed, formed for 
example as international society or community, nation, or humanity.   
This is not to say that Vitoria’s division of peoples was as chasmic as that which 
later entered international law and is more usually taken as constituent of its modern 
form. It was only in the early nineteenth century, Alexandrowicz tells us, that 
international law ‘started contracting into a regional (purely European) legal system, 
 
81 Id., generally. 
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abandoning its centuries-old tradition of universality based on the natural law 
doctrine. …International law sank to regional dimensions though it still carried the 
label of universality’.82 Doubtless there was a qualitative shift then, and it was the 
case that the range of peoples admissable to the international came to be more and 
more confined in terms of European systems of sovereign rule. Yet the division and 
its constituent effect can also be seen as continuous.83   
This is now, supposedly, a continuity that no longer continues. In the genealogies of 
the trade, the imperial constitution of international law is a matter of the past, for now 
the impelling power within international law comes solely from nation-states freed of 
the imperial carapace. The definitive, if not then complete, shift is said to come in the 
aftermath of the First World War and at the considerable urging of the United States, 
a nation-state which thereafter parades its opposition to imperialism and lends support 
to the efforts of colonies to achieve a national independence. If then one were to insist 
on some continuing efficacy of imperium, this would be to advance a further 
phantasm, to advance even the phantasm of a phantasm if one traced a continuity from 
the displaced theologic, to the displaced imperial, and thence to the national. My 
 
82 C. H. Alexandrowicz,  An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the 
East Indies 2 (1967). 
 
83 See e.g. H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis   28 (1919). 
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argument will now attempt to illustrate that this seemingly tenuous exercise is an 
entirely apt one. 
In the broad configuration of power inhabiting international law, some continuity 
would seem to be quite evident. Imperialism cannot be thought, or thought only, as a 
monadic force which then contrasts radically with the diversity of nations. Yet neither 
can nation be thought as simply an autarchy entirely and immanently subordinating its 
relation to a wider world. There is much, I will argue later, to distinguish the two 
scenes but for now, and still in terms of a broad configuration of power as it affects 
international law, similarity is the thing that will be more marked. Although ‘the great 
powers’ of the nineteenth century were seen, and saw themselves, as involved in a 
common project which was distinguished by its occidental, progressive, civilizing, 
(and so forth) character, this was certainly not at the expense of national assertion. 
Quite the contrary, it was a stridently national assertion, one attended by an intense 
rivalry indicatively called ‘inter-imperial’. Nor was this national extraversion 
confined to the explicitly imperial but, rather, it created and sustained ‘the comity of 
nations’ – a comity of, yet beyond, any singular nation, imperial or otherwise. For 
nation, and especially the nation of modern imperialism, was not a thing contained in 
its territorially bounded plot, much as territory was taken to be definitive of the 
modern nation. As Eternal Object nation was, and is, oriented ever beyond the 
determinate – oriented, in terms of the primal claims of modern nation, towards the 
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universal.84 The very coming to the universal from within, from a particular if elect 
national place, left the universal unencompassed and unlimited. This, however, did 
not derogate from but, rather, enhanced destinal claims to the universal, claims of the 
particular, determinate nation to an exemplary, evolutionary, or prerogative hold on 
the universal. The universal could, then, inhabit nation without being confined and 
negated by nation’s determinate dimension. And the determinate could inhabit the 
universal without dissipating in the universal’s ‘lack’ of limitation. 
It was the diapason of other Eternal Objects such as the comity or the community of 
nations which, as it were, filled the divide between nation as particular and as 
universal. These Objects were neither simply congeries of nation nor a cohering 
position apart, but both. Within such entities as comity and community, nation was 
stretched on a scalar progression from an obdurate particularity to a perfected 
universality. The universal was being achieved by some particular civilized nations at 
one end of the scale, but it was decidedly far from being achieved by those little more 
than savage nations at the other. And even if there has been an ostensible softening of 
the criteria of inclusion and exclusion which go to constitute the community of 
nations, there remain effective variations:  
 
 
84 The point and its connecting with the determinate, such as ‘territory’, in constituting 
nation has been explored in Fitzpatrick supra note 58, chapter 4. 
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[T]he triumphant liberal-democratic ‘new world order’ is more and more 
marked by a frontier separating its ‘inside’ from its ‘outside’ – a frontier 
between those who succeed to remain ‘within’ (the ‘developed’, those to 
whom the rules of human rights, social security, etc., apply), and the 
others, the excluded (the main concern of the ‘developed’ apropos of them 
is to contain their explosive potential, even if the price to be paid for it is 
the neglect of the elementary democratic principles).85
 
There is a manifestation of this new world order troubling perceptions of 
international law, and one which could trouble also the notion of national imperialism 
being developed here, and that is globalization. Amidst the miasma of what 
globalization is said to be, there is one constant, or near constant, characteristic 
attributed to it, its displacing or comprehensively subordinating nation. Perversely, 
however, globalization can serve to confirm the continuing significance of national 
imperialism. To encapsulate the argument, what we find is that for dominant nations 
 
85 S. Zizek, Eastern European Liberalism and its Borderlines, 14 Oxford Literary 
Review 25, at 34. (1992). For a consummate case study of the division and its 
constituent force in international economic law see S. Pahuja, Technologies of 
Empire: IMF Conditionality and the Reinscription of the North/South Divide 13 
Leiden Journal of International Law 749 (2000). 
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their extraversion towards the universal is not accompanied by their dissipation or 
subordination in some global domain. They are not diminished in their determinate or 
particular being. On the contrary, the more powerful the nation, then the more its 
extraversion universally will merge with and enhance its particular being. So, what we 
find in the operative avatars of the global – such as the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization – is not some power uniformly or 
even widely spread but, rather, a power concentrated in a few potent and distinct 
nations. It is not as if, in the modernist scenario laid out by Anthony King, that now 
with ‘world interdependence…there are no Others’; such a condition can be discerned 
only hesitantly, ‘in theory at least’, and discerned paradoxically in persisting 
‘conditions of grossly uneven development’.86 In any case, with the discourses of 
globalisation now seeming to fade, in a more explicitly fractious world the 
configuration of national imperialism is more starkly evident. The point will be 
illustrated in some detail shortly, but to be going on with we could instance its 
notorious assertion in Bobbitt’s The Shield of Achilles with his ‘market-states’ – 
predominant nations who are bidden to pursue a strategy which would ‘shape’ 
 
86 A. D. King, The Times and Spaces of Modernity (or Who Needs Post-modernism?), 
in M. Featherstone et al. (Eds.), Global Modernities (1995), at 114. 
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inevitable war so as to ensure that ‘we can win’ and thus overcome a somewhat 
indefinite but ominous host of enemies.87
To the despair of its apologists, international law would seem to provide a 
spectacular instance of law’s dependence. Even formally speaking, nothing seems to 
come effectively between it and the sovereign power, or powers, of its unruly 
subjects. This leaves, as Carty discerns, ‘a void at the very heart of international 
society which is marked by the myth of international legal order’; in the result, ‘there 
is no legal solidarity on the part of states towards one another’.88 But when peered 
into, borrowing the thought from Blanchot, the void proves to be disappointing.89 It is 
densely inhabited, not least in a solidary dimension which will be taken up shortly. 
Staying for now with the content more directly contributed by power, given his 
uniquely perceptive accounts of power and international law, Carty would not see the 
 
87 P. Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History xxvii 
(2002). 
 
88 A. Carty, Myths of International Legal Order: Past and Present X Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 3, at 10 (1997) – his emphasis. 
 
89 M. Blanchot, The Madness of the Day, trans. L. Davis 8 (1981). 
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void as an emptying of power.90 It contains, for example, ‘a framework’ which has 
‘superimposed the European concept of state order globally’.91 It is that order, in turn, 
which has given international law its distinctly occidental cast, not just or even so 
much in terms of its evident receptivity to the power of imperium or the power of 
predominant nations, but also in terms of its own processes of determination, 
especially judicial processes. Law’s actuality to itself does not escape the made 
quality of the actual: 
 
[A]ctuality is made: it is important to know what it is made of, but it is 
just as important to know that it is made. It is not given, but actively 
produced, sifted, contained, and performatively interpreted by many 
hierarchizing and selective procedures – false or artificial procedures that 
are always in the service of forces and interests of which their ‘subjects’ 
and agents…are never sufficiently aware. The ‘reality’ (to which 
 
90 See generally A. Carty, The Decay of International Law? A Reappraisal of the 
Limits of Legal Imagination in International Affairs (1986). 
 
91 Carty supra note 88, at 6. 
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‘actuality’ refers) – however singular, irreducible, stubborn, painful, or 
tragic it may be – reaches us through fictional constructions.92
 
The main fictional construction through which the reality of international law 
reaches us is custom. Although this is a custom attuned to the ‘practice’ of states, it is 
not a matter of a securely existent law selectively taking content from an extraneous 
custom. It is, rather, a matter of an unmediated inhabiting of international law by 
custom. By responsively reflecting state practice and by taking it directly to 
international law, custom does not disturb the sovereignty of states yet it endows an 
international law apart from them and of which they are the subjects. So perfectly 
fitting is custom to these constituent dimensions of international law that one 
influential view of international law would see it as basically customary, as ‘in the 
usual terminology of international lawyers, a set of customary rules’.93 Consistently 
with this, there is also a general view that treaties can be changed by custom, even if 
 
92 The Deconstruction of Actuality in Derrida supra note 39, at 86 – his emphasis. 
 
93 Hart supra note 7, at 228. See also H. Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal 
Theory 108 (1992). 
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there is no clear or uniform view on the effective ways in which this can be done.94 
And even short of the acceptance of such change through custom, there are accepted 
modes of ‘interpretation’ or of the recognition of changing practice in their effect on 
treaties which are customary in all but name.95 These fragile propensities of treaties 
might go to explain why they can be considered unstable and porous in comparison 
with other types of law, in comparison with the solidity myopically visited on 
constitutional law for example.96 Most dramatically, however, ius cogens, often seen 
as a creation of custom, can be replaced or displaced by custom or contrary practice, 
even if, again, the exact ways in which this can be done are much debated.97  
 
94 See for a perceptive account of this and related issues M. Byers, The Shifting 
Foundations of International Law 13 European Journal of International Law 21 
(2001). And cf. N. P. Van Deven, Taking One for the Team…46 St. Louis University 
Law Journal 1091, at 1111-1113 (2002). 
 
95 E.g. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 (3) and 62. 
 
96 See e.g. I. M. Maazel, What is the European Union? 16 Brigham Young University 
Journal of Public Law 243, at 245-248 (2002). 
 
97 I. A. Shearer, Starke’s International Law, 11th edition 49-50 (1994). 
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To illustrate and advance the argument, I will take an egregious case asserting the 
solitary efficacy of practice in the making and unmaking of international law. By way 
of commenting, in November 2002, on a debate about Iraq in the Security Council of 
the United Nations, Glennon established, to his own satisfaction at least, that for the 
United States ‘it would not be unlawful to attack Iraq’ because ‘the Charter provisions 
governing the use of force are simply no longer regarded as binding international 
law’.98 The only regard Glennon has regard to is that of the United States, but he does 
adduce a clinching observation: ‘since 1945, dozens of member states [of the United 
Nations] have engaged in well over 100 interstate conflicts that have killed millions of 
people’, and by their deeds you shall know them, for ‘the general prohibition against 
the use of force, as expressed in the Charter, has in this way been supplanted by a 
changed intent as expressed in deeds’ – and, it could have been added, the United 
States has been pre-eminent in its contribution to this supposed process.99 It may 
 
98 M. J. Glennon, How War Left the War Behind, New York Times, 21 November 
2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/21/opinion/21GLEN.html?ex=1038886995&ei=1&
en=09296b9d456ale27.  
 
99 Id.. And see for the magnitude of the contribution by the United States, G. Vidal, 
Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: How We Got to Be So Hated xii, 22-41 (2002). 
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indeed be readily agreed, with Carty, that ‘[h]ardly anyone argues that international 
law is or can be based on anything other than the practice of States’, that even the 
most peremptory ius cogens (as this prohibition on the use of force is or was) must 
give way if it is no longer accepted as ‘fundamental’, but Glennon is insufficiently 
nuanced when it comes to the making actual of practice and acceptance.100 If the 
normative were always negated by contrary practice, either it could not exist or its 
existence would be pointless, since the normative subsists in and even thrives on the 
transgression of it. If the prohibited use of force never took place, either it would 
never occur to anyone that it be prohibited or there would be no point in the 
prohibition. It would either never have been in an actuality, or it would be 
normatively a ‘dead letter’. But with practice still operative proscribed, it may, and 
often will, be the case that the more instances there are of the contrary practice, the 
more there is a strengthening of the proscribing norm. The greater use of proscribed 
force may make actual a greater, a more pointed, a more effective operation of the 
proscription, rather than lead to its decline or elimination.  
More compendiously, transgressive practice both undermines and constitutes the 
normative. The key question, the incessant and ineluctable question, in international 
law is whether the transgression as a contrary practice goes to show that the norm is 
no longer customary, or whether it is a breach of the customary norm and hence 
 
100 Carty supra note 90, at 1. 
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calling for correction. Despite sedulous efforts by decision-makers in international 
law to shore up the customary norm in itself, to make its actuality invariant in the face 
of what is to come, this effort must ultimately fail and fail intrinsically. The norm can 
never be automatically brought to bear, inertly applied to what is an ever new 
situation. It is always a question, the legal question, whether, and through what 
remade perception of it, the norm is going to ‘apply’. If the situation could always be 
automatically matched by an invariant norm, there would be no call for law, for the 
legal decision, for the ‘fictional’ making of the law, or for custom.101
That line of argument can connect with the account of law in the second section of 
this paper by way of a closer look at custom. It is at least intriguing that, in an 
occidental lexicon, ‘custom’ can be used for the ways of brute savages and for ‘the 
gentle civilizer of nations’ that is international law.102 The correspondence may help 
break what is an excessive emphasis on one or other dimension of custom in each of 
the two locations. With the savage, set in ‘the cake of custom’, the iron invariance of 
custom could be affirmed because it reflected unchanging practice, the ‘habits’ of the 
 
101 That line of argument is a quite unoriginal condensation of much of J. Derrida, 
Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’ trans. M. Quaintance in Acts of 
Religion (2002). And evoking as well Derrida supra note 92, at 86. 
 
102 Koskenniemi supra note 54, title and epigraph. 
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torpid savage.103 In these perceptions of it, custom is said to depend constituently on 
being within the homogenous and intimate natural community. Yet with the 
international, there is a miraculous transformation to a promiscuous custom freed of 
any enduring attachment and ever responsive to what is ever changing. If it ceases to 
change with changing practice, it can no longer be custom. Of course, my point would 
be that custom combines both extremities of its being in a determinant outcome. What 
it ‘is’ is trajected via its normative content towards all that it may become. 
Somewhere along that trajectory, the decision determinantly intervenes, creating the 
actuality of custom ‘for the time being’. Custom, then, presents law’s constituent 
dimensions writ large. But with law, or at least with law in its characteristic occidental 
rendering, there is some cohering force exterior to it uniting these dimensions, making 
them into a cohering actuality. A national sovereign may provide this force. Or there 
will be cohering modes within law itself, something that law’s sociologic makes 
possible, such as Hart’s ‘secondary rules’ enabling ‘primary rules of obligation’ to be 
definitively recognized, changed, or applied.104 These ‘secondary rules’ internal to 
law were related earlier to an ethics of the existent and a community, both in law. I 
 
103 W. Bagehot, Physics and Politics, or Thoughts on the Application of the Principles 
of ‘Natural Selection’ and ‘Inheritance’ to Political Society  19, 21 (n.d.). 
 
104 Hart supra note 7, at 89-96. 
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will come to a consideration of such things in the setting of international law by way 
of the perennial question of what may provide coherence for or in international law. 
This is not a propitious enquiry. The obstacle usually advanced is the lack of a 
unified and unifying sovereign. What there is instead is a congries of sovereign states 
each claiming completeness. It may be testament, a testament compounded, to the 
futility of intellectual endeavour to point out that not only have perspicacious efforts 
to render this completeness failed, but also the very failure has itself failed to dent the 
pretence of completeness; furthermore, there has been a failure adequately to theorize 
the relation that inevitably flows from the lack of completeness.105 We are here back 
to the void and to there being ‘no legal solidarity on the part of states to one 
another’.106 In this perception, Carty’s critical contribution is at one with a tradition of 
absence. Vattel decreed that, although there could be universal duty binding its 
members, the society of nations was not to involve any of its members ‘yield[ing] 
…rights to the general body’: each independent state claims to be, and actually is, 
 
105 For the perspicacious see e.g. Rousseau supra note 18, at 95, and J.-J. Rousseau, 
The Government of Poland, trans. Willmore Kendall (1972). For remedial reference 
to the failure of theory see Nancy supra note 60, and J.-L. Nancy, Being Singular 
Plural (2000). 
 
106 Carty supra note 88, at 10. 
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‘independent of all the others’.107 The stark conclusion had already been drawn by 
Hobbes for whom ‘the law of nations’ allowed of no overarching rule, no 
commonality of its own, the absence of some surpassing Leviathan being fatal to 
conceiving of this law of nations as law proper.108
What this tradition reproduces, by insisting still on something like a society of 
states or nations, is the impossible society of conjoint insularity outlined in the earlier 
account of the sociologic of law. For such a society to acquire sociality, for its 
members to be in common, they would have to be totally so. In a seeming paradox, 
this society thence becomes a society of the totality thereby eliminating the 
distinctness and particularity of its members. That, in turn, evokes a more fitful 
tradition of presence, one that was most evident in the Europe of the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries in which international law would subsist in the elevation of 
a transcendent recourse to some all-resolving reason or will, usually entailing a 
‘universal history that is inseparable from a kind of plan of nature that aims for a total, 
 
107 E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of National Law Applied to the 
Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns Vol. 3, trans. C.G. Fenwick 9 
(1916). 
 
108 T. Hobbes,  Leviathan 159 (chapter 30) (1952). 
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perfect political unification of the human species’.109 Revivals or resemblances can be 
currently seen in the human of human rights and of humanitarian intervention with 
their overriding of state sovereignty.110 Short of a completely subordinating social 
totality, there has to be – as we saw when considering the sociologic – some marker of 
the commonality, some determinate or determinable being-in-common for the 
members of the society to have their own distinct and particular being. It is as a 
response to this necessity that we could understand the naturalist quality often 
attributed to custom or to ‘community’ and ‘society’ in international law, and 
conceive of them joining the ranks of Eternal Objects.  
The way in which international law concentrates the sociologic and provides a 
being-in-common enabling the distinct identity of its subject states can be illustrated 
in the contention between what a leading text tells us are the ‘two principal theories as 
to the nature, function and effect of recognition’ of nation-states in international law: 
one is the ‘constitutive theory’ in which ‘recognition alone’ creates the nation-state; 
the other is ‘the declaratory or evidentiary theory’ in which the nation-state ‘exists as 
 
109 J. Derrida, The Right to Philosophy from a Cosmopolitan Point of View in Derrida 
supra note 39, at 333. 
 
110 On the latter see A. M. Weisburd, International Law and the Problem of Evil 34 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 225, at 262. 
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such prior to and independently of recognition’, recognition then being ‘merely a 
formal acknowledgement of an established situation of fact’.111 Only with the latter 
theory can it be said that ‘the international legal order is still constituted by [nation-
states as] de facto self-constituted concentrations of power’.112 As the origin of 
international law, the nation-state must be already given independently of or apart 
from the international law it originates. All international law can do is declare the 
existence of something already and factually in being, a scenario securely founded in 
the evident facts of territory, effective control over it, and such. Yet these facts, even 
in their seeming solidity, cannot speak for themselves. They have to pass through a 
constituent process, a process concentrating in itself a complex body of law, and that 
process ‘recognises’ a particular type of political organization and affectivity. In so 
doing it rejects, or does not even begin to extend itself to, other types – types falling 
outside of the historically specific occidental norm of national rectitude. In this way, 
international law constitutes the nation-state constituting it. 
 
111 Shearer supra note 97, at 120 – his emphasis. The argument there is that the 
evidentiary theory is predominant, an argument made out in terms of the legal rules 
giving effect to it. 
 
112 Carty supra note 88, at 12. 
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Seeing international law in this way as a cohering formation of the sociologic seems 
to contradict the standard comparison between its dissipated quality and the state-
centred solidity of municipal law. Almost in passing, it could be said that this easy 
attribution of such solidity could not survive the knowledge of nation-states that was 
either intimate or extensive. Which is not to deny that a centered and uniform plane of 
determination is often, but not invariably, attached to municipal law. The landscape of 
international law, in contrast, is taken to be diverse and uneven. Yet the conception of 
an international law, even if prior to the nineteenth century under other names, is very 
much one of the longue durée rather than the short. And if regard is had to the 
dimensions of law outlined earlier, the contrast between international and municipal 
law may not be so sharp. For a start, the ground of comparison is shared in that, as we 
saw, law is necessary for the municipal sovereign. Further, this is something of a 
groundless ground in that the cohering of law need not be, and ultimately cannot be, 
oriented monadically, by some sovereign endowment or otherwise. Law’s cohering 
cannot be procrustean since law necessarily refuses any primal attachment. It’s 
cohering will always be in question. So, with any ‘system’ of law we should expect 
contingency and instability, and expect as much stability as there is.113  
All of which is not to deny that if, returning to Savigny’s dictum, law ‘has no 
existence in itself, but rather has its being in the very life of men’, there are not still 
 
113 Cf. D. Pears, Wittgenstein 168 (1971). 
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different ways of living within different types of law.114 So as to distinguish living in 
international law and in what can be a more straitened scene of the municipal, I will 
return to the ethics of the existent considered earlier. As we saw, those ethics exist in 
law in a truncated way. Their first existence as protean possibility is reduced in the 
second, reduced in law made determinate. The quality accorded that reduction is what 
becomes crucial here. With many municipal systems, particularly in their occidental 
manifestation, the first existence is taken to be absorbed without remainder in the 
second. If this can be seen as an instance of the metaphysics of presence, it can also be 
seen as instantiating a jurisprudence of presence. The ineradicably challenge posed by 
the ethics of the existent to this completeness of presence is either ignored or 
relegated to a jurisprudential arcanum where is remains a persistent puzzle.   
We could take as an example, one the significance of which will unfold as it is 
developed and one that correlates with equality before the law, the requirement that 
laws be ‘general’. Because of this requirement, it is often said that a decision confined 
to a particular determination does not count as law.115 But law is made determinate in 
the decision, and the decision will always be specific. Neither the decision nor the 
 
114 See Agamben supra note 10, at 27. 
 
115 E.g. Rousseau supra note 18, at 82; J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, 
in Two Treatises of Government 409 (para. 142) (1965). 
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circumstances provoking it will ever be exactly repeatable or repeated.116 Yet, if the 
general cannot find itself in law’s determinate existence, it cannot be so general that it 
has no bearing on anything specific, and thence no operative content at all. Hence the 
common and paradoxical requirement that law’s ‘generality must be specific’.117 
What the general ‘does’ of course is to straddle and link the two existences of the 
ethics of the existent. It cannot be wedded ultimately either to the vacuous possibility 
of the first existence or to the unrepeatable specificity of the second. It must ‘be’ of 
both. As such, and drawing this from Derrida again, it is a ‘fictional construction’ 
through which the ‘actuality’ of law reaches us, a way through which this actuality is 
‘actively produced, sifted, contained, and performatively interpreted by many 
hierarchizing and selective procedures…’.118
The broadly equivalent fictional constructions in international law do not take on 
such a supposedly subsuming presence. The first existence of the ethics is not so 
focally contained, its possibility not so singularly encompassed. Its openness is more 
 
116 See generally Derrida supra note 101. 
 
117 F. Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and 
Legal Theory 28 (1957). 
 
118 Derrida supra note 39 (Actuality), at 86. 
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persistently and more receptively maintained. There is, then, in international law a 
less mediated entry of those ‘claims, demands, admissions, criticism’ which go to its 
making.119 Opinio juris has something of an immediacy of effect, for example. It is 
inevitable that the ethical claims to equality, freedom, impartial consideration, and to 
regard within community be reduced in the actuality of the determinate, but with 
international law that outcome is not so generalized, not so much rendered in terms 
that are evenly produced and overarching. 
 
5.  AMERICAN EMPIRE 
 
Still, if an ineradicable ethics of the existent is what sustains international law in its 
autonomous efficacy, if it is that ethics which provides a position from which the 
pretensions of power may be countered, this may merely give an added poignancy to 
the dependence of international law on power. For what is also ineradicable is this 
dependence, and the very openness of international law facilitates the entry and 
effectiveness of power. That effectiveness consists in power making law determinate 
and in so doing it would contain and direct the ethics of the existent. It is at this point 
that we could especially appreciate the wisdom of Koskenniemi’s observing that ‘[i]n 
the absence of an overarching standpoint, legal technique will reveal itself as more 
 
 119 Hart supra note 7, at 88. 
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evidently political than ever before’.120 An overarching standpoint within 
international law, even if itself ‘political’, would serve to tame new content by 
providing some concentrated means of opposing and absorbing it. Without such a 
standpoint, and Koskenniemi sees us as currently quite bereft, ‘international law 
becomes pragmatism all the way down’, and it becomes so most markedly, it could be 
added, as mere instrumentalism.121
If, then, international law is merely or ultimately the receptacle and instrument of 
power, this section on international law and American empire could now end with an 
abrupt and obvious conclusion. That may be a relief to more people than the writer, 
but one question, one provocation to further enquiry, would remain. If international 
law is so abject, so thoroughly receptive to power, and if, as its history richly reveals, 
it has been particularly accommodating of imperium, why should the assertion of 
American empire ever go beyond or be contrary to international law? Then it could be 
asked whether it might be that there is ‘in’ law, in international law, a life that in some 
identifiable way counters and resists imperium? And might we not be able to identify 
this identifiable way at those points where law counters and resists imperium? 
 
120 Koskenniemi supra note 102, at 516. 
 
121 Id.. 
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All of which may sound promising but there is the further and inhibiting question of 
how these points, in their turn, could be identified given the absence of ‘overarching’ 
markers of law within international law and given its related responsiveness to power. 
This difficulty is specifically aggravated in the case of American empire. Although its 
claims to imperial rule are becoming more explicit, they are not obligingly contrasted 
with rule through law. Quite the contrary. If we return to those explicit imperial 
arrogations of The National Security Strategy outlined at the beginning of this paper, 
we find that they are accompanied by fervent and repeated, if vicarious, commitments 
to the rule of law, to the rule of law as one of the ‘nonnegotiable demands of human 
dignity’, as something which others are bidden to ‘embrace’ or praised for 
‘respecting’.122 So much is at least politic if, in terms of my earlier argument, any 
ruling continuance depends on law, and that argument extends to imperial rule. Since 
the distinct efficacy of international law, or the perception of that efficacy, is obscured 
in the various ways just outlined, here it will be approached obliquely. Situations will 
be taken where the United States acts contrary to or disregards international law, or 
where it seeks to go beyond or contain international law, and the attempt will then be 
made to derive from these negative relegations of international law what may 
positively and resistantly be ‘in’ it. 
 
122 Bush supra note 1, at 3, 9-10, 19, 22, 28. 
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Perhaps the situation that has of late generated most debate about whether the 
United States is adhering to norms of international law is its treatment of detained 
‘terrorists’. An initial distinction needs to be drawn. Considerable scope could be 
allowed this treatment and it would still remain within range of legal justification. 
Numerous provisions of the law of international human rights would run counter to 
various powers of virtually indefinite detention without trial which have been recently 
exercised by the United States. But some of these powers emanate from specific legal 
enactments and justifications for these can be advanced for their ‘exceptional’ 
necessity in the cause of national security. The pertinent situations here, however, are 
those where imperium goes beyond and subordinates the domain of law. Going on 
decisions of courts in the United States, this is the situation with the detentions at 
Guantanamo Bay.123 Staying within the ethos of the oblique, that specific situation 
can be summarized from a judgement of the English Court of Appeal in a case 
concerning one of the people detained, Mr Abbasi, in which judgement the court was 
of the opinion that ‘in apparent contravention of fundamental principles recognised by 
both [English and American] jurisdictions and by international law, Mr Abbasi is at 
 
123 These are decisions in one case the latest manifestation of which is Khaled A. F. Al 
Odah et al. v. United States of American et al. United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, No 02-5251, March 11, 2003. I am grateful to Stewart 
Motha for this reference. 
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present arbitrarily detained in a “legal black-hole”’, because he was ‘subject to 
indefinite detention in territory over which the United States has exclusive control 
with no opportunity to challenge the legitimacy of his detention before any court or 
tribunal’.124 This, in the view of the court, ‘objectionable’ scene was one confirmed 
by the United States courts in restricting their jurisdiction to review the acts of the 
executive to the effects of those acts on people who are either citizens of the United 
States or within the territory over which the United States is sovereign. And, so it was 
held, the people detained at Guantanamo Bay were neither.125 The circumstances may 
have been unique but there is also much older judicial authority in the United States to 
the same effect, authority enabling the executive to act in an imperial abandon freed 
of even the most fundamental constitutional restraints.126
 
124 R. ex parte Abbasi & Anor. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs & Secretary of State for the Home Department (Court of Appeal, Civil 
Division, [2002] EWCA Civ. 1598) paras. 64 and 66. I am grateful to Stewart Motha 
for this reference also. 
 
125 Id., para. 66 for ‘objectionable’ and Khaled supra note 123 for the rest. 
 
126 See the ‘Insular Cases’ as discussed in Fitzpatrick supra note 58, at 175-177. A 
broadly similar freedom of imperial action was bestowed by the Indian Cases so-
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It could still be the case that matter, the matter of international law, comes into this 
black hole but if it does, like any matter coming into a black hole, we do not know 
what happens to it. For example, there has been much significant debate over the 
application of the Geneva Conventions to this situation.127 Yet it would seem that the 
government of the United States has not shown the remotest concern with the 
procedure in the Conventions for determining their applicability.128 It has been 
observed that ‘the administration has taken a menu approach to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949: It picks only what it wants and ignores the rest.’129 The point 
could be countered in the administration’s claim that the Geneva Conventions do not 
 
called decided by the Supreme Court in the early nineteenth century: see id., at 164-
175. 
 
127 For argument on both sides see Human Rights Watch, 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/01us012802-1tr.html (2002). 
 
128 On the question of applicability see Article 5 of the Geneva Convention of 1949. 
 
129 C. Levendosky, We Cannot Ignore Provisions of the Geneva Conventions, Casper 
Star-Tribune, February 10, reproduced in First Amendment Cyber-Tribune Fact, 
http://w3trib.com/FACT/1st.lev.genevaconventions.html (2002). 
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apply and such that are brought to bear are only done so as a matter of its grace and 
favour. No matter how contested the status of the people being held, it is at least 
difficult to avoid the application to them of numerous international human rights laws 
dealing with what could broadly be called due process. What all these things tend to 
indicate is not matter awaiting definitive determination by international law but, 
rather, a perceived irrelevance or a disregard of international law. 
Conceivably, the treatment of international law in that situation could be put down 
to the transgression, uncertainty and debate essential to any legal order, rather than 
being definitive of its subordination to something else. That excuse or mitigation will 
be qualified shortly but, more immediately, it would not accord with the way in which 
people detained are routinely and officially described. They are not presented as  
deviants or proper enemies in war who could return to the amenable law and its peace. 
Rather, they are ‘illegal’ and ‘unlawful’ in the sense of being beyond the law; they are 
‘outlaws’, ‘bad guys’, and as such ‘evil’.130 (The same and much the same 
terminology is extended to states and ‘regimes’, an extension which will be 
 
130 See e.g. D. H. Rumsfeld, News Conference 4 (2001), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2001/t11132001_t113nb.html; E. MacAskill, , 
R. Norton-Taylor, , and J. Borger, Julian, UK Dilemma over Treatment of Captives 
and What will happen to the Prisoners? The Guardian, 18 January 2002. 
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considered soon.) The sentiment, at least, is religious, and usually religiose as well, 
and this is a religion of a Manichaean kind. 
With a touch of inevitability, this characterisation returns us to the neo-sacral 
quality of the Eternal Object, and it will lead us onto the dramatically different 
directions in which the Object's juridical dimensions can move. For that purpose, we 
can return also to that ur-instance of the Eternal Object, to humanity or the human, 
and its juridical dimensions can be explicitly connected to international human rights. 
Humanity can be particularly emplaced and yet be universally, encompassingly 
human if its delimited place is joined with the element of right in its assertion of what 
all should be. Those who are not as they should be fall outside of the range of the 
human and, to repeat somewhat, being apart from the universal can only be absolutely 
apart, of a different order of existence. They are the ‘evil’ that, in Badiou’s terms, 
negatively endows human rights with content.131 As such, the excluded provide an 
inherent transgression of human rights enabling the content of the human to emanate 
specularly from the transgressive, this being a universal content that cannot be 
contained and positively specified in any operative way. Yet, as we also saw, that 
same universal, that same ‘lack’ of positive closure, extends the human inclusively 
and, it could now be added, extends human rights likewise. 
 
131 A. Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. P. Hallward 8-9 
(2001). 
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In that divide, human rights can be seen as always juridically poised between the 
determinate that excludes and the inclusively receptive or responsive. Where human 
rights then ‘go’ depends on whether, with the inevitable combining of the two 
dimensions, human rights is predominantly oriented in the direction of the one or of 
the other. If the determinate is predominant, the orientation becomes imperial. The 
responsive is inclined and made conformable to the singularly determinate. The 
contrary inclination is from the determinate to the responsive, producing what Baxi 
calls ‘contemporary human rights’, a ‘paradigm…based on the premise of radical self-
determination’, one in which ‘human rights enunciations proliferate, becoming as 
specific as the networks from which they arise and also in turn sustain’.132 My 
immediate concern is not with this opening of the human but with its imperial 
enclosing. 
The claustrated content of The National Security Strategy can serve again to 
indicate the terms of this enclosing, not this time the terms of an unsurpassable and 
ultimate power, but now the milieu of what is enclosed. Both the preface to the 
document as well as the ‘strategy’ proper open with an announced end of history: 
 
132 U. Baxi, The Future of Human Rights 29, at 31 (2002). The dual nature of human 
rights is well captured by A. Sarat and T. P. Kearns, The Unsettled Status of Human 
Rights: An Introduction in A. Sarat, and T. R. Kearns,  (Eds), Human Rights: 
Concepts, Contests, Contingencies (2001). 
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‘The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended 
with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom – and a single sustainable model for 
national success…,’ and referring to the same period and the same type of struggle: 
‘That great struggle is over. The militant visions of class, nation, and race which 
promised utopia and delivered misery have been defeated and discredited.’133 What 
distinguishes the elect nations already conforming to the ‘single, sustainable model 
for national success’ is their commitment to ‘basic human rights’ – the ‘evil’ of 
‘outlaw groups and regimes’ being manifest in their disregard for human rights, along 
with their lack of civilization.134 The single, sustainable model is one attended with 
much detail, a detail that marvellously coincides with neo-liberal economic 
imperatives and their attendant ‘good governance’, but in its more generalized 
prescriptions, this model is put in terms of ‘the market’.135 And lest the deluded think 
the end of history would usher in an era of perpetual peace, it has, rather, ushered in 
one of perpetual war, a war propounded in the National Security Strategy to preserve 
 
133 Bush supra note 1, preface. 
 
134 Id., and G. W. Bush, The World must Hold Saddam to Account The Guardian 4, 
September 13 (2002). 
 
135 Bush supra note 1, at 17 and 19. 
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the peace, and to secure the predominance of the United States against such as 
‘[t]errorists…organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern 
technologies against us’.136
To show how these components of the ‘new world order’ go to settle the relation 
between imperium and international law, enquiry will have to be broadened beyond 
the happy conjunction of the two in The National Security Strategy. This broadening 
can be by way of certain jobbing oracles of the ‘new world order’. These are 
intellectuals whose evidentiary significance, at least in this setting, consists in the 
widespread attention and, usually, approbation they receive. I will consider recent 
works of three. Starting, aptly enough, with the begetter of the thesis of the end of 
history, or of an end similar to that announced in The National Security Strategy, 
Fukuyama and the Strategy are also at one in being concerned with some impertinent 
persistence on the part of history. In Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the 
Biotechnology Revolution, Fukuyama mutes the triumphalism of the end of history; 
we are now told that it is not quite ended because ‘we are nowhere near the end of 
science’, which is just as well if one is writing a book about its potent effects.137 In all 
 
136 Id., preface. 
 
137 F. Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology 
Revolution (2002). 
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other seemingly severable respects however, we are still assured that history is quite 
ended. So, September 11, 2001 ‘raised doubts about the end-of-history thesis’ because 
it was seen as symptomatic of a clash of civilizations, borrowing another formula, a 
clash ‘between the West and Islam’; but there is no such substantial clash: Islam 
presents only an eliminable rump, ‘a desperate rearguard action that will in time be 
overwhelmed by the broader tide of modernization.’138 Still, ‘science and technology’ 
do provide a ‘malign ingenuity’ with a means to strike at ‘our civilization’s key 
vulnerabilities’.139 This apprehension about the ominous utility of science and 
technology and the general mix of achieved certitude and vulnerability are both things 
which Fukuyama shares with The National Security Strategy.140 Furthermore, 
Fukuyama’s previous reliance on modern society’s ability to make the vagaries of 
history immanent to itself is now necessarily supplemented by a new guide through 
these remaining uncertainties, and that guide is provided by a human nature asserted 
 
138 Id., at xii. And for the thesis on the end of history see F. Fukuyama, The End of 
History and the Last Man (1992). 
 
139 Fukuyama supra note 136, at xii-xiii. 
 
140 E.g. Bush supra note 1, preface. 
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through human rights.141 In terms of constituent exclusion, then, empire appears more 
benign than its apologist for it would also extend itself to ‘Islam’ even if in other 
moments it would also be excluded. The ‘evil’ is then constituted as that which is 
beyond the retrievable human, hyper-excluded and irredeemably barred, the 
‘minority’ of ‘terrorists’ and ‘fundamentalists’. 
In extending the focus now beyond human rights to take account more extensively 
of law and international law, we could approach the second oracle, Bobbitt and The 
Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History.142 In this considerable 
volume, Bobbitt’s combinatory powers join the aura of inevitability in the guise of an 
historical determinism with a realm of freedom in which ‘we’ adopt strategies to 
master an ‘era’ of uncertainty, strategies which fuse war and the market and are made 
effective by the ‘market-state’ which is characterized as the ‘emerging constitutional 
order that promises to maximize the opportunity of its people, tending to privatize 
many state activities and making representative government more responsive to the 
market’.143 It is within this fusion of war and the market that Bobbitt’s book ‘treats of 
 
141 Fukuyama supra note 136, chapters 7 and 8. 
 
142 Bobbitt supra note 87. 
 
143 Id., at 819-823, 912, and see generally chapters 11 and 12. 
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the relationship between strategy and law’, both being seen as ‘key instruments of the 
State’.144 Strategy and law configure with the market and with war. The market-state 
still allows, or will allow, law a part in shaping the ‘internal order’ of that state, but 
otherwise ‘the old ways of the superseded nation-state (its use of law to bring about 
certain desired moral outcomes, for example) fall away’.145 War, possibly ‘a new, 
epochal war’, is inevitable, and strategy must ‘shape’ war to ensure that ‘we can 
win’.146 Indeed, war generally is something inevitable, it ‘is a natural condition of the 
State…and cannot be finally avoided’, and part of Bobbitt’s ‘main point’ is that war 
and law are ‘inextricably intertwined’, there is a ‘mutually supportive’ relation 
between them.147 Although in this book Bobbitt is extensively concerned with 
international law and varied theories of it, the place of law in his general scheme, as it 
has just been outlined, exhibits ‘pragmatism all the way down’.148 With that scheme 
 
144 Id., at xxvii, 814. 
 
145 Id., at xxvi, 814. 
 
146 Id., at xxvii. 
 
147 Id., at xxvii, xxxi, 819. 
 
148 E.g. id., at 642-661; Koskenniemi supra note 54, at 516. 
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we find, much like the dominant strand of legal theorizing in the United States, that 
law, pragmatically, is to be known by its effects. What is producing the effects, then, 
is accorded, by massive implication at least, an anteriority of position with law 
becoming subordinated to that position in a variety of instrumentalism. 
The final member of that oracular trio sets that prior positioning more explicitly. 
This is Kagan and his Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World 
Order.149 The book is a brief and blunt account of the divide between ‘America’ as 
the repository of effective power and a Europe found to be a ‘Paradise’. This little-
known condition connotes a European fantasy of self-sufficient peace with law, the 
law espoused by the weak and an unreliable international law, and this fantasy can 
exist only because the sustaining power of the United States extends its ‘military 
might’ to protectively envelop the realm of law thereby shielding it from the ‘jungle’ 
that is the rest of the world, that enveloping being possible it seems (although the 
connection is not made so explicitly) because of ‘a uniquely American form of 
universalistic nationalism’ inseparable from an ideology of ‘expansionism’ which is 
characteristic of American history: indeed The National Security Strategy should not 
 
 
149 Kagan supra note 8. 
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have occasioned such surprise as it did because its ambitions were ‘little more’ than a 
restatement of long-standing American policies.150  
The ‘little more’ can be seen as an unabashed assertion of the type of imperialism 
involved. The closest comparison would be with ‘the empire of trade’, ‘the empire of 
liberty’, the ‘bright empire’ espoused by the British and the French in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, but with the addition of a degree of centralized and 
centralizing control that would surpass these, something redolent more of Rome. It is 
Europe’s nineteenth century, however, which sees the full development of the 
mechanism of expansion and appropriation relevant here, the self-regulating market. 
This, as The National Security Strategy and other pronunciamentos tirelessly tell us, 
because reminding does seem to be necessary, is a realm of freedom. But this is, to 
borrow the phrase, an enduring freedom, a freedom which would secure the ability of 
a set condition to extend itself imperatively.151 That imperative quality is shored up in 
a certain inevitability which is partly a matter of the end of history and the key part 
the market plays in that end, but mainly a matter of naturalist assumption. The market 
is  comprehensively evoked as  natural and naturally existent, condition. It 
 
150 Id., 3, 16, 40, 74, 76, 86-88, 93. 
  
151 P. Fitzpatrick, Enduring Freedom in 5 Theory & Event (2002) 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/504fitzpatrick.htm. 
 
 86
                                                
concentrates various of the values that ‘are right and true for every person, in every 
society’, as The National Security Strategy reveals.152 Or, as Alan Greenspan 
recognizes, markets ‘are an expression of the deepest truths about human nature 
and…as a result, they will ultimately be correct’.153 Whilst waiting for the ultimate, 
and until such correctness is factually and universally realized, the free market stands 
as the apotheosis that all should come to. In this way the free market becomes or 
evokes a condition of being which already, naturally is, yet one needing extensive and 
tentacular measures for it to be brought about and upheld. Among the host of these – 
‘conditionalities’ required by the International Monetary Fund or attached to ‘aid’ and 
to trading agreements, for example – there is law. Although The National Security 
Strategy recognizes that ‘commerce depends on the rule of law’, this is but a variation 
on the ways in which the Strategy presents law as the instrument of the market, or the 
instrument of a preordained type of polity.154 In all, the market joins the transcendent 
ranks of the Eternal Objects as one whose juridical dimensions are imperially 
 
152 Bush supra note 1, preface. 
 
153 R. H. Wade, US Hegemony and the World Bank: The Fight over People and Ideas, 
9 Review of International Political Economy 215, at 215. (2002). 
 
154 Bush supra note 1, at 3, 9-10, 19, 22, 28. 
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inclined, and certainly not one constituently inclined in a responsive regard to what is 
beyond its ‘enduring’ objectness. 
The reign of an assertively enduring freedom can hardly be a pacific one and the 
United States has for long been pre-eminent among nations in its resort to war. What 
The National Security Strategy heralds, or perhaps more confirms, is a struggle 
‘different from any other war in our history’, and that difference consists in its being 
of ‘uncertain duration’ as well as a ‘global enterprise’, a characteristic that includes its 
not being confined to any specific enemy.155 Just how distinctive these characteristics 
may be is debatable. There have been world wars, so-called, and there has been ‘total’ 
war which would fit Rumsfeld’s perception of ‘America’s new war’: ‘wars in the 
twenty-first century will increasingly require all elements of national power: 
economic, diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and both overt and 
covert military operations.’156 The totality of this ‘new war’ occupies quite another 
dimension, however – that of the illimitability of empire. 
In stark contrast to the modes in which war is usually delimited, this new condition 
of war is projected so illimitably in cause, space and time that it becomes, taking Gore 
 
155 Id., preface, 5. 
 
156 Rumsfeld supra note 4, at 30. 
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Vidal’s resonant title, a perpetual war for perpetual peace.157 It resembles more a 
perpetual police but without the legal infrastructure on which policing criminality 
would depend. The mediations of law or of the juridical which could attend war and 
police action more conventionally perceived can here only be subsumed 
instrumentally within the ‘total’ project, a project commensurate with the 
completeness of imperium itself. Those who fall outside of this totality and 
completeness, those who are the butt of this ‘war’, are quite apart from the total and 
the complete.  They are fit, therefore, only to be kept separate from it, or eliminated. 
These are the constantly decried ‘outlaw regimes’, ‘tyrants’ with their ‘evil designs’, 
‘rogue states’, the ‘axis of evil’.158 Even if we grant the ever expansive and 
increasingly tenuous justifications for this war extracted from international law – 
 
157 Vidal supra note 99. 
 
158 E.g. Bush supra note 1, preface, 13, 15; Bush supra note 133; G. W. Bush,  Our 
Power to Change the World The Guardian 20, September 12  (2002).  Where nations 
or national territories are invaded, this is not a classic war on a sovereign state but war 
on some vaguely illegitimate entity. The casting of the enemy quite beyond and the 
claim to an enduring completeness would heighten that perception of vulnerability 
referred to earlier and instanced in Bush supra note 1, preface and Fukuyama supra 
note 136, at xii-xiii. 
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humanitarian intervention, the ‘right’ of pre-emptive attack, a defensive attack against 
‘emerging threats before they are fully formed’, for example – 159 international law 
cannot extend to this condition of war. The ultimacy of imperium, its being ‘strong 
enough’ to counter any ‘surpassing, or equalling, [of] the power of the United States’, 
the exclusiveness and exclusions of ‘a single sustainable model’, all are incompatible 
with the inextinguishable openness of law.160 This openness could now, with a heavy 
irony, be contrasted to the ‘openness’, the ‘open societies’ insisted on in The National 
Security Strategy, a contained ‘openness’, an openness always to be conditioned by 
and within a fully and ‘enduringly’ closed domain. 
If international law has some efficacy apart from the powers inevitably enabling it, 
there should be some dissonance or divergence between it and empire. Whether and 
how that may be so is the final question now taken up in this paper. To have 
confirmed a standard view hardly suggests that my argument was highly original, but 
Kagan has already revealed that, in the European perception, America sees the world 
as divided between good and evil, seeks finality in international affairs, and is 
sceptical about international law.161 The official self-perception of the United States 
 
159 Bush supra note 1, preface for the phrase.  
 
160 Id., preface and at 30. 
 
161 Kagan supra note 8, at 2. 
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would seem to differ on at least the latter score, for one of the indicators helpfully 
listed in The National Security Strategy of states being roguish is that they ‘display no 
regard for international law,…and callously violate international treaties to which they 
are party’.162 As for violation, it could be considered beyond the range of concern 
here because, in my argument, transgression is integral to the law. However, ‘crime, 
like virtue, has its degrees.’163 Violation which would negate or undermine the very 
hold of law and its processes, as at Guantanamo Bay, does mark a divide between law 
and empire, and recent history has provided other dramatic instances.164  
But some extensive transgression would seem to be prerequisite to concluding, 
without more, that the divide was definitive, that it amounted to a basic disregard. 
 
 
162 Bush supra note 1, at 14. 
 
163 Racine, Phédre IV: 2. 
 
164 Of the unfortunate abundance of instances, torture and its production of coerced 
speech is especially emphatic in its destruction of law’s ethics of the existent. For a 
survey of evidence of the recent use of torture by or on behalf of the United States see 
D. Campbell, US Interrogators turn to ‘Torture Lite’, The Guardian, 25 January 2003, 
at 17. 
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Despite increasingly frequent accusations to the contrary, the United States does not 
seem to transgress international law extensively. Such virtue, however, could be due 
to the want of opportunity or necessity to sin, for there is a great deal of international 
law which the United States does not accept. The prospect of the United States 
ratifying treaties which touch upon domestic concerns within the nation is  
particularly fraught. The power to enter into treaties is a federal one vested by the 
constitution in the President with the concurrence of the Senate, of ‘two thirds of the 
Senators present’.165 When combined with the entirely appropriate senatorial 
deference to the rights and interests of states in the federation, this amounts to a potent 
block on ratifying treaties. It has, to take a large instance, amounted to a virtual bar on 
ratifying treaties to do with human rights. If, for example, the Convention on the 
 
165 Article II section 2 and Article I section 10. For a pellucid and brief account of the 
relevant law see  A. W. B. Simpson Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and 
the Genesis of the European Convention 470-473, 818-823 (2001). For further 
references see id., at 470. And for a recent and illuminating critical account see J. N. 
Moore, Treaty Interpretation, The Constitution and the Rule of Law 42 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 163 (2001). 
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Rights of the Child were ratified, this could inhibit the execution of children.166 Yet, 
given its now central place in constituting standards of international legality, human 
rights provides an especially pointed test of the willingness, or otherwise, of a nation 
to subordinate domestic concerns in a community of law. This, in a sense, is the crux. 
The countervailing ‘theory’ of human rights which has, in effect, been advanced by 
the United States as empire, and one which resonates with the imperial appropriation 
of human rights analysed earlier, is a theory adroitly rendered by Simpson as an 
‘export theory of human rights’.167 The values enshrined in human rights are already 
intrinsic to the United States, and so it is something of an irrelevance that explicit 
acceptance of the international law of human rights is almost non-existent. Human 
rights need only be considered as something to be dispatched elsewhere. As Simpson 
says of one momentous set of negotiations over a human rights treaty, ‘whatever 
mixture of motives influenced the major powers as the primary actors in the 
negotiations, self-improvement certainly did not feature amongst them’.168 More 
 
166 It could eventually have inhibited also the detention of children at Guantanamo 
Bay: see O. Burkeman, Children Held at Guantanamo Bay, The Guardian, 24 April 
2003, at 1. 
 
167 Simpson supra note 164, at 347-348. 
 
168 Id., at 348. 
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broadly, the export theory of human rights typifies an imperium, and an Occident, 
whose claims to a surpassing completeness is the quotidian norm. 
Even short of treaties being submitted to the severity of this ratifying process, there 
is another standard perception which sees the United States as increasingly reluctant 
to conclude treaties. Madeline Albright, something of an expert on these matters, 
accuses the advisors to George W. Bush of talking about the rule of law whilst 
seeming ‘allergic to treaties designed to strengthen the rule of law in such areas as 
money-laundering, biological weapons, crimes against humanity and the 
environment’.169 ‘Crimes against humanity’ evokes the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, a particularly significant, if hardly unique, instance of 
the United States refusing the jurisdiction of international courts.170 Having 
successfully applied pressure in the negotiation of the treaty to ensure that the 
jurisdiction of the court would not be ‘universal’ but, rather, national and territorial, 
and President Clinton having signed the treaty (although the politics of that were 
devious), the United States then negated the signature. This it did in terms of Article 
 
 
169 G. Whittell, Giles, Albright Attacks US Foreign Policy as Schizophrenic, The 
Times, 21 May 2002, at 8. 
 
170 E.g. Nicaragua v. United States, Merits, [1986] ICJ Rep. 14. 
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18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties by making ‘its intention clear not 
to become party to the treaty’. This negated also its obligation under that same Article 
‘not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force’. All of 
which proved to be a prelude to the intense pressure the United States applied to 
several nations to exempt its citizens from prosecution.171
Attenuated as they may be in law once they are made determinate, if the constituent 
ethics of law do not reach the point of legal determination, they cannot be effective at 
all. Here the effect of disregard, active opposition, and violation merge. They 
cumulatively conform to that definitive difference between imperium and a 
community of law.  It is not as if law’s determinate content, responding as it does to 
the demands of predominant power, would be likely to pose a ruptural challenge to 
American empire.  That challenge would come from an ethics of the existent within 
law, from an insistence this ethics would carry into law made determinate, an 
insistence on equality, freedom and impartiality within law, and an insistence on a 
regardful community of law. 
 
171 See I. Traynor, East Europeans Torn on the Rack by International Court Row, The 
Guardian, 17 August 2002, at 16. 
 
